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"One of these days the people of Louisiana are going to get
good government-and they aren't going to like it." Huey Long
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, according to the Public Affairs Research Council of
Louisiana, one of the state's most "significant defects" was its
administrative structure.' The Council found the Louisiana
administrative structure "weakened by the multiplicity of separate
agencies and by the fragmentation of authority among numerous...
commissions which enjoy special constitutional protection."2 Over
thirty years later, the perennial debate about the structure of
Louisiana's administrative set-up, the creation of the Division of
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. David A. Marcello, Administrative Practice Under the 1974 Constitution:
A "Silver Anniversary" Review, 62 LA. L. REV. 185, 192 (2001) (noting the
findings of the PAR Voters Guide to the Proposed Constitution).
2. Id.
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Administrative Law, and the allocation of a limited set of powers
between branches of the government and administrative agencies
indicates that many may still hold such a critique. A cursory
review of the Louisiana Legislature website indicates the existence
of over 350 various boards and commissions, covering a wide
range of topics including highway safety, seafood promotion and
marketing, the eradication of Formosan termites and boll weevils
(two separate boards), and barber examinations.
3
This Comment seeks to shed some light on this continuing
debate. To do so, it is necessary to understand some fundamental
principles of Louisiana administrative law. While a primer of this
sort certainly cannot be exhaustive, the authors have sought to
reveal some of the most litigated and contentious issues in
Louisiana administrative law. Throughout the Comment are
spotlights on current problems that arise during litigation over the
scope of the power of administrative agencies. Additionally, the
authors make references to further commentary about state
administrative law, and in particular, Louisiana administrative law.
Part II of this Comment addresses constitutional issues that
have arisen in Louisiana courts concerning administrative
agencies, particularly conflicts over separation of powers and the
jurisdiction of agencies vis-i-vis the district and appellate courts of
the state. Part III examines the two main functions of
administrative agencies: (1) to adjudicate, ad hoc, issues arising
between an agency and particular members of its regulated
population, and (2) to promulgate rules of general applicability to
that regulated population. In addition, there is a spotlight on a
unique situation in which rulemaking and adjudication collide
(without much guidance from the courts): issues involving the
many, many, licensing boards of the state. Part IV examines the
function and operation of judicial review and deference to agency
actions. Part V offers brief concluding remarks. As the 2008
Louisiana Law Review Symposium demonstrates, the jury is still
out on whether the rise of the administrative state has given
Louisiana "good government." But, more important than the
3. The complete list of Louisiana boards and commissions is available on the
legislature's website at http://www.legis.state.la.us/boards.htm (last visited April
2, 2008).
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actual decision on the "good government" question, is the
dialogue, which the authors and the Volume 68 Louisiana Law
Review hope will lead to developments in the law.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN LOUISIANA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Separation of Powers
Article II of the Louisiana Constitution divides the power of
the state government into "three separate branches: legislative,
executive and judicial. ' 4 Additionally, it declares that "no one of
these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall
exercise power belonging to either of the others." 5 Administrative
bodies such as boards and commissions thus raise constitutional
separation of powers issues as they often grant appointees of the
executive branch the authority to fill in the details of legislative
policy.
1. Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Bodies
The propriety of delegation of authority to an administrative
agency depends on whether such authority is purely legislative,
which violates constitutional separation of powers, or merely
ministerial administrative authority, which does not.6  The
Louisiana Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test to
determine whether a statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative
authority. Under the Schwegmann test,
4. LA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. LA. CONST. art. II, § 2. The language of article II, section 2 and the
principle that "unlike the federal constitution, a state constitution's provisions are
not grants of power but instead are limitations on the otherwise plenary power of
the people of a state exercised through its legislature" from State v. Miller, 857 So.
2d 423, 427 (La. 2003) (citing Meredith v. Ieyoub, 700 So. 2d 478, 481 (La. 1997)
combine to derive the principle "that legislative power, conferred under
constitutional provisions, cannot be delegated by the Legislature either to the
people or to any other body of authority." Miller, 857 So. 2d at 427.
6. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. McCrory, 112 So. 2d 606,
613 (La. 1959) ("So long as the regulation or action of the official or board
authorized by statute does not in effect determine what the law shall be, or involve
the exercise of primary and independent discretion, but only determines within
prescribed limits some fact upon which the law by its own terms operates, such
regulation is administrative and not legislative in its nature.").
[Vol. 681316
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a delegation to an administrative agency is valid if the
enabling statute (1) contains a clear expression of
legislative policy, (2) prescribes sufficient standards to
guide the agency in the execution of that policy, and (3) is
accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards to protect
against abuse of discretion by the agency.
7
This three-prong test applies regardless of whether the
legislature has delegated authority related to civil or criminal
actions. In State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., defendants in
a criminal case challenged their convictions on the grounds that the
statutory and regulatory scheme under which they were charged
constituted an unconstitutional delegation to the executive branch
of the legislature's sole authority to define felonies.
8
In that case, the owner and operator of a paint and body shop
paid a scrap dealer to dispose of several containers of paint
thinner.9 The scrap dealer then disposed of the containers in two
uninhabited houses.' 0 The owner of the houses later found the
containers and reported them to the police."
The Louisiana Hazardous Waste Control Law makes it a
criminal offense, inter alia, to transport, store, or dispose of
materials defined as hazardous waste. 12  While the legislature
provided a definition of what constitutes "hazardous waste,"' 3 it
vested the authority to develop objective criteria for determining
the identifying characteristics of such waste to the Department of
7. State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 639 So. 2d 707, 712 (La. 1994)
(citing State v. Barthelemy, 545 So. 2d 531, 534 (La. 1989)).
8. Id. at 711 ("[T]he determination and definition of acts which are
punishable as crimes are purely legislative functions ...... (quoting State v.
Taylor, 479 So. 2d 339, 341 (La. 1985))).
9. Id. at 708.
10. Id.
11. Id,
12. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30:2183(G)(2) (2008).
13. All Pro Paint, 639 So. 2d at 708 ('Hazardous Waste' means any waste,
or combination of wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, physical,
or chemical characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness,
or pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or
otherwise managed. Such definition shall be applied only to those wastes
identified and designated as such by the department, consistent with applicable
federal laws and regulations." (emphasis added) (citing § 30:2173(2))).
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Environmental Quality (DEQ). 14 Under such authority, the DEQ
determined that one category of hazardous waste includes ignitable
materials that have a flashpoint of less than 140 degrees
Fahrenheit, as tests revealed the liquids at issue did.15 At trial, the
defendants were convicted, fined, and placed on three years
supervised probation. 16
On appeal, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal
incorrectly concluded that the three-prong test did not apply to
felony cases and reversed the convictions. 7 On review, however,
the Louisiana Supreme Court applied the Schwegmann test and
found the delegation to be within the permits of the constitutional
separation of powers requirements because the authority delegated
to the DEQ to determine objective criteria "prescribe[d] sufficient
standards to guide [the] DEQ's enforcement of legislative will.'
8
Another criminal case, State v. Miller,'9 highlights that proper
delegations of legislative authority must contain an express
enabling statute granting authority to an administrative body or
official. Additionally, it provides an example of how a completely
unfettered delegation can violate the second prong of the
Schwegmann test.
In Miller, authorities indicted an inmate and two guards of the
Jefferson Parish Correctional Center for offenses related to the
discovery of a cell phone in the common area of the prison.2 °
Specifically, the defendants were alleged to have violated
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 14:402(E), which prohibits both
possession and introduction of several items on the premises of
14. Id. at 708 n.2 ('The HWCL authorizes the DEQ to 'develop, consistent
with federal regulations, objective criteria for identifying characteristics of
hazardous wastes and for listing the hazardous wastes which shall be subject to the
provisions of this chapter."' (quoting § 30:2186(A))).
15. Id. at 708.
16. Id. at 710.
17. Id. at 713.
18. Id. at 717.
19. 857 So. 2d 423 (La. 2003).
20. Id. at 425 ("After obtaining a search warrant for the information stored in
the phone and a subpoena duces tecum for the cellular phone company's records,
the investigating officers determined that the phone contained numbers directly
linked to the defendant Corey Miller .... It was further discovered that Sheriff's
Deputies Latasha Witherspoon and Emanuel Stevenson were instrumental in
placing the cellular phone in Miller's possession.").
1318 [Vol. 68
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21 adiint aenmrtdlsprisons. In addition to a specifically enumerated list of
prohibited items, the last sentence of the statute read, "the
definition of contraband is not restricted to those articles set forth
hereinabove.' '22  Under this catchall provision, the sheriff
determined that the cell phone constituted contraband.23
The state argued that the legislature implicitly delegated the
authority to define what constitutes contraband to the governing
authority of the jail.24 The Louisiana Supreme Court, however,
reasoned that "for the executive to have the power to perform
legislative functions, there must first be an express delegation
either in the constitution itself or by the Legislature in a statute.
' 25
Finding no such express delegation to the sheriff in the catchall
provision, the court found that "classifying the cellular phone and
charger as contraband under La. R.S. 14:402(E) constitutes an
unconstitutional usurpation of legislative authority and a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine."
26
Although the court could have stopped with its determination
that the statute lacked express delegation, it further stated that even
if the statute did contain a delegation of authority to the sheriff,
that delegation would be improper under both the plain language of
the constitution and the Schwegmann test.2 7 First, the constitution
prohibits local governments from defining and punishing felony
21. Id. at426.
22. Id. (quoting § 14:402(E)).
23. Id. at 430.
24. Id. at 428.
25. Id. (emphasis added). The court based its reasoning on principles of state
constitutional law as well as an historical examination of Louisiana's separation of
powers provision in article II, section 2. With respect to the latter, the court
reasoned:
Article II, § 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provided that "no
one [branch], nor any person or collection of persons holding office in
one of them, shall exercise power properly belonging to either of the
others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or
permitted." In the revision of the constitution in 1974, the constitutional
convention substituted the phrase "except as otherwise provided in this
constitution" for the phrase "hereinafter expressly directed or permitted."
The revised provision, however, was intended to retain the substantive
effect of the previous provision, which mandated an express delegation
of authority to another branch of government.
Id. (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 430.
27. Id.
0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
offenses. 2 8 A delegation to the sheriff to define contraband would
grant an executive of local government authority to do just that in
contravention of the constitution. Additionally, the delegation
would be unconstitutional because "the provision provides
absolutely no standards by which the power delegated is to be
exercised and renders the delegation completely unfettered.,
29
Thus, the constitutionality of such delegation would fail under the
second prong of the Schwegmann test.
Some commentators propose that rather than determining
whether a legislative delegation contains sufficient standards under
which an administrative body properly can make rules,30 a more
appropriate determination is whether the enabling statutes contain
sufficient procedural safeguards against arbitrary agency action.
The Louisiana Supreme Court flirted with this idea in State v.
Broom, but ultimately concluded that, at least in the context of
criminal sanctions, the Louisiana Constitution's separation of
powers provisions demand that the legislature provide sufficient
standards so that an agency does not create or define offenses.
31
In Broom, the state charged the defendant truck driver, who
allegedly left his explosive-transporting pickup truck unattended in
a parking lot while ordering food in a restaurant, with violating an
agency-promulgated rule stating that "the operator of a conveyance
transporting explosives shall not leave such vehicle unattended
except while actually making deliveries." 32 The court considered
28. Id. at 431 (quoting LA. CONST. art. VI, § 9(A)(1) ("No local government
subdivision shall define and provide for the punishment of a felony . .
29. Id.
30. See State v. Broom, 439 So. 2d 357, 362 n.7 (La. 1983) ("Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis, in his Administrative Law Treatise, points out that courts
have often upheld delegations under the 'adequate guiding standards' test where
there were virtually no expressed standards at all. For example, delegations have
been upheld which were guided only by the following standards: 'just and
reasonable' 'public interest' 'public convenience, interest, or necessity' 'unfair
methods of competition' [and] 'reasonable variations.' He states that this result
was imperative in view of the complexity of today's governmental undertakings.
He concludes that a modem regulatory agency would be an impossibility if power
could not be delegated with vague or non-explicit standards. Thus, the complexity
of the issues has caused a need for the regulatory agencies, which the courts have
recognized by upholding the delegations to the agencies. However, they do so by
giving lip service to the adequate guiding standards test when in fact no such
guiding standards exist." (citations omitted)).
31. Id. at369.
32. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, pt. 11, § 14.6 (2007).
1320 [Vol. 68
2008] LOUISIANA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A PRIMER 1321
the regulatory scheme under which the state charged the
defendant. 33 The legislature delegated to the Secretary of Public
Safety the authority to "make, promulgate and enforce regulations
setting forth minimum general standards covering manufacture,
transportation (including loading and unloading), use, sale,
handling and storage of explosives." 34 The legislature delegated
the authority to the Secretary of Public Safety with the standard
that the regulations were to be both "reasonably necessary" to
protect the "health, welfare and safety of the public," as well as in
"substantial conformity with the published rules and standards of
the Institute of Makers of explosives." 35 The defendant argued that
the state prosecuted him under rules that resulted from the
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Secretary
of Public Safety.
36
On first hearing, the court concluded that the prosecution under
the Secretary of Public Safety's rules did not violate the
constitution's separation of powers provisions. In reaching its
conclusion, the court relied heavily on the fact that the legislature
provided significant "procedural safeguards" against arbitrary
administrative action by expressly stating that the secretary's
promulgation of rules must be in accordance with the Louisiana
Administrative Procedures Act (LAPA).37 Specifically, the court
found that the provisions of Louisiana Revised Statues sections
49:968 through 49:970, which provide for oversight of the
rulemaking process by the legislature and the governor, rendered
33. Broom, 439 So. 2d at 358.
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1471.9 (1970), repealed by 1995 La. Acts No.
1139, § 2.
35. Id.
36. Broom, 439 So. 2d at 363--64 (La. 1983).
37. Id.
38. Id. The court summarized the procedural safeguards of the LAPA as
follows:
The statute provides that prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of
any regulations the agency must submit a report relative to the proposed
rule change to the appropriate standing committees of the legislature.
The Department of Public Safety is to report to the House Committee on
the Judiciary and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. La. R.S.
49:968(B)(13). The standing committees then conduct hearings on all
proposed rule changes through oversight committees (a majority o the
standing committee) with a special view toward determining whether the
proposed rule is in conformity with the intent of the enabling legislation,
and considering the advisability of the rule change. La. R.S. 49:968(D).
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the defendant's argument of unconstitutional delegation to be
invalid.3 9
On rehearing, however, the court rejected the notion that the
procedural safeguards contained in the LAPA could save an
otherwise unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.40  It
specifically found the enabling statute at issue to be vague and
without sufficient standards to direct the Secretary of Public
Safety, particularly in light of the grave criminal penalties
associated with violating the Secretary's orders.4 1 Thus, where the
legislature does not provide sufficient standards under which an
agency can adopt rules, courts render its enabling statutes to
violate the Louisiana Constitution's separation of powers
provisions.
42
2. Encroachment on the Powers ofAnother Branch
Article II's prohibition on any one branch exercising powers
constitutionally delegated to another branch creates additional
separation of powers issues.43 Because the constitution grants the
governor both the general power to appoint officials to boards and
commissions as well as the power to execute the laws of the
state,44 constitutional issues arise when the legislature delegates
power to administrative boards and grants itself appointment
power. Additionally, the constitution vests authority over the
state's fiscal affairs in the legislature, a power that raises
separation of powers issues when administrative bodies and
In addition to these review procedures, La. R.S. 49:969 gives the
legislature the authority to nullify any rule or regulation by concurrent
resolution. The governor, likewise, has veto power over the rules and
regulations. La. R.S. 49:970.
Id. at 364.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 367.
41. Id. ("The legislature not only delegated to the director of public safety the
authority to create felonies, it has relinquished most of the supervision over that
authority to its subcommittees and the governor. . . . LSA-R.S. 40:1471.18
provides grave penalties for undefined felonies and is itself vague and
ambiguous.")
42. Id.
43. LA. CONST. art. II, § 2.
44. LA. CONST. art. IV, §5(H) & (A).
1322 [Vol. 68
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officials spend state money in manners not expressly approved by
the legislature.45
a. Legislative Encroachment on Executive Power
One example of alleged legislative encroachment on executive
powers arose in the context of appointments to administrative
boards and commissions. In State Board of Ethics v. Green, the
Board of Ethics for Elected Officials brought a civil action against
defendants whom it alleged illegally made loans to a political
campaign.46  While fighting the charges on the merits, the
defendants argued that because the legislature granted itself the
power to appoint members to the ethics board, the right of the
board to bring civil actions against alleged violators interfered with
the governor's constitutional power to execute the state's laws.
47
In Green, the state argued that the constitution grants the
governor power to appoint members of boards and commissions
only where the law does not otherwise provide for appointment
48process. Positing that the legislature acted within its power to
prescribe the appointment process for the Ethics Board, the state
argued that the board was acting purely as an executive body when
it instituted the civil action and thus did not violate constitutional
separation of powers.
49
45. See LA. CONST. art. III.
46. 545 So. 2d 1031 (La. 1989), rev'don rehearing by State v. Green, 566 So.
2d 623 (La. 1990).
47. Id. at 1034. Under article IV, section 5(A) of the Louisiana Constitution,
the governor is the chief executive officer of the state, charged with seeing that
laws are faithfully executed. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(A).
48. Green, 545 So. 2d at 1037 (discussing the state's argument vis-i-vis the
Louisiana Constitution article IV, section 5(H)(1)). Article IV of the Louisiana
Constitution provides,
The governor shall appoint, subject to confirmation by the Senate, the
head of each department in the executive branch whose election or
appointment is not provided by this constitution and the members of each
board and commission in the executive branch whose election or
appointment is not provided by this constitution or by law.
LA. CONST. art. IV, §5(H)(1) (emphasis added).
49. Green, 545 So. 2d at 1037.
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On rehearing,50 the court agreed with the state, holding that the
Legislature's appointment of the majority of the board's members
did "not violate separation of powers principles as long as (1) the
appointment of the members by the Legislature was
constitutionally valid and (2) the appointees are not subject to such
significant legislative control that the Legislature can be deemed to
be performing executive functions through its control of the
members of the board in the executive branch." 51 The court found
that the language of Louisiana Constitution article IV, section 5,52
satisfied the first prong.53 With respect to the second, the court
found that the appointment procedures imposed "significant
restraints on legislative control over the actions of the Board," and
therefore did not violate the separation of powers provisions of the
constitution.54
Another example of legislative encroachment on the executive
arose when the legislature enacted a statute declaring that a
conviction of a felony constituted cause for mandatory termination
of classified state employees. In AFSCAIE, Council # 17 v. State,
the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals fired a classified
employee after his conviction for aggravated battery. 55 While the
convicted employee's appeal of the termination was pending
before the State Civil Service Commission, he sought a declaratory
50. On original hearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the State's
argument to be without merit. Id. at 1031. Although the court found the
legislatively-determined appointment procedures to be constitutionally valid, it
held that
the issue in this case is not the power of the legislature to enact
legislation providing for the appointment by the legislature itself of
members of boards and commissions in the executive branch, but is the
power of the legislature to vest such legislatively-appointed boards and
commissions with the authority to exercise the exclusive executive
function of enforcing the law by filing suit against alleged violators of the
law.
Id. at 1037. Thus, the board could not institute civil proceedings against alleged
violators of the Campaign Finance Disclosure Act. Id.
51. State v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623, 624 (La. 1990).
52. Id. at 624-25. See also supra note 48 for the language of article IV, §
5(H)(1).
53. Green, 566 So. 2d at 624-25.
54. Id at 625-26. Specifically, the court noted that the legislation provided
that "members of the Board are appointed for staggered six-year terms and can be
removed only for cause. [Additionally,] [l]egislators, employees of the
Legislature, and other public servants cannot be appointed." Id.
55. 789 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (La. 2001).
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judgment that, by statutorily defining cause for termination of all
state employees, the legislature usurped the constitutional power of
the Civil Service Commission to define the cause for disciplining a
classified employee.
56
The court began its analysis by noting that the framers of the
constitution incorporated the State Civil Service Commission
within its provisions "to protect public career employees from
political discrimination by eliminating the 'spoils' system."
57
Article X of the Louisiana Constitution grants the Civil Service
Commission the rulemaking "powers for the administration and
regulation of... classified service, including the power to adopt
rules for regulating employment" and "personnel matters."
Under this rulemaking authority, the Civil Service Commission
"define[d] cause for termination as 'conduct which impairs the
efficient or orderly operation of the public service."' 59  The
Department of Health and Hospitals, however, urged that the
statute was a proper exercise of the legislature's power "to define
and punish criminal conduct."
60
The court held that while the compulsory termination of
classified state employees who have been judged guilty of a felony
is a reasonable policy, such determination can come
constitutionally only from the Civil Service Commission.
6 1
Despite the fact that the legislature enjoys the general power to
provide punishment for crimes, its attempt to condemn classified
state employees to termination upon their felony convictions
"encroach[ed] upon the constitutional authority of the Civil Service
Commission" to define cause for termination.
62
56. Id. at 1265-66.
57. Id. at 1268 (citing Bannister v. Dep't of Streets, 666 So. 2d 641, 645 (La.
1996)).
58. LA. CONST. art. X, § 10(A)(1).
59. AFSCME, 789 So. 2d at 1268 (quoting Civil Service Rule 1.5.2.01).
60. Id. at 1266.
61. Id. at 1269.
62. Id.
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b. Administrative /Executive Encroachment on Legislative
Power
Louisiana courts have found encroachment on legislative
power where executive departments have spent money in ways not
expressly authorized by law. In Meredith v. Ieyoub, the Louisiana
Supreme Court dealt with a situation in which the Attorney
General contracted with a private law firm to "investigate and
prosecute state environmental damage claims on a contingency fee
basis" without any express authority to do so under the constitution
or by statute. 63 In that case, the Louisiana Independent Oil & Gas
Association and some of its individual members collectively
sought both judicial declaration that the agreement was in violation
of the constitution as well as an injunction prohibiting the private
law firm from acting under the terms of the contract.
64
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the scheme violated the
longstanding principle that "the possession, control,
administration, and disposition of the property, funds, and
revenues of the state, are matters appertaining exclusively to the
legislative department." 65  The Attorney General, on the other
hand, argued that his constitutional authority to institute civil
proceedings and to appoint assistant attorneys included the right to
hire private firms to work on a contingency fee basis. 66 Finding no
63. 700 So. 2d 478, 479-83 (La. 1997).
64. Id at 479-80. In addition to the argument that the Attorney General
lacked express authority to enter into the contract, the plaintiffs alleged that the
statute specifically prohibited the contingency fee arrangement. Id. Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 30:2205, the plaintiffs averred, provides that all sums
recovered through recovery of judgments, penalties, and settlements arising out of
environmental cases be paid into the state treasury for funding of the Hazardous
Waste Site Cleanup Fund. Id. On this point and in addition to its finding that the
contingency fee contract with the private law firm violated the constitution, the
court agreed the plaintiffs. Id. It wrote, "[tihe language of [section 30:2205] is
clear and unambiguous: '[a]ll sums recovered through judgments' means all sums,
not all sums remaining after the Attorney General has paid his contingency fee
lawyers." Id, at 482.
65. Meredith, 700 So. 2d at 481 (citing State v. Duhe, 9 So. 2d 517, 521
(1942)).
66. Id. at 482. Article IV, section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution provides:
As necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or interest of the
state, the attorney generally shall have authority (1) to institute,
prosecute, or intervene in any civil action or proceeding; (2) upon the
written request of a district attorney, to advise and assist in the
prosecution of any criminal case; and (3) for cause, when authorized by
1326 [Vol. 68
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authority for the Attorney General to enter into a contingency fee
arrangement with private law firms in his constitutional grant of
power, the court held that "the power over finances must be
expressly granted by the constitution to another branch of
government or else that power remains with the Legislature.
'" 67
c. Executive Encroachment on Executive Power
While the 1974 Constitution provides for three coequal
branches of state government, it separates the executive branch
into the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,
attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture,
commissioner of insurance, and commissioner of elections (each
operating as independent executive entities).68 As the constitution
provides for powers and duties of each of these offices,
Louisiana's disjunctive executive at least raises the possibility of
one officer of the executive branch encroaching on the
constitutional power of another officer of the same branch.
Although the case law surrounding this issue is not well
developed, the constitutional question did arise in the context of a
controversy as to whether the governor or attorney general would
represent the state in the desegregation cases of 1991.69 The
constitution declares that the governor is the "chief executive
officer of the state . . . and shall see that the laws are faithfully
executed. 7 °  On the other hand, the constitution defines the
attorney general as the "chief legal officer of the state" and gives
him the power to instigate or intervene in ongoing cases "[a]s
necessary for the assertion or protection of any right or interest of
the state.",71 The issue arose in federal court, and the United States
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the question to the
the court which would have original jurisdiction and subject to judicial
review, (a) to institute, prosecute, or... (b) to supersede any attorney
representing the state in any civil or criminal action."
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
67. Meredith, 700 So. 2d at 482.
68. See Art. IV, §§ 5-12.
69. State ex rel. Guste v. Roemer, 949 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1991).
70. Art. IV, § 5.
71. Art. IV, § 8.
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Louisiana Supreme Court.7 2 Before the court decided the issue,
however, the Fifth Circuit withdrew the question and the Louisiana
Supreme Court never issued a ruling.73 Older case law suggests
that the attorney general exists regardless of the governor's
approval.74 However, no case law examines the issue after the
adoption of the 1974 Constitution.
B. Jurisdiction
Further constitutional tensions arise in the context of the scope
of original jurisdiction. Article V of the Louisiana Constitution
"vests the district courts with 'original jurisdiction of all civil...
matters,' and 'exclusive original jurisdiction of... cases involving
. . . the state . . . as a defendant."' 75  In the context of
administrative law, issues arise under this constitutional provision
when the legislature attempts to confer jurisdiction to bodies other
than the district courts where the constitution does not expressly
provide for such jurisdiction.
For example, in In re American Waste & Pollution Control v.
State, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the consolidation
of four cases in which the DEQ either denied the issuance of waste
disposal and water discharge permits or issued "such permits with
conditions." 76  Particularly, the court had to decide the
constitutionality of the statute which provided that the Louisiana
First Circuit Court of Appeal should hear appeals of the DEQ
decisions.77
By the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes section
30:2024, the legislature decreed that appeals of final decisions or
orders of the DEQ in permit or enforcement actions should be
brought to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. 78 After
consolidating these cases, however, the first circuit repudiated its
72. Roemer, 949 F.2d 145.
73. State ex rel. Guste v. Roemer, 593 So. 2d 377 (La. 1992).
74. See State v. Texas Co., 7 So. 2d 161 (La. 1942).
75. Art. V, § 16(A). See also In re Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co. v.
State, 588 So. 2d 367, 368 (La. 1991).
76. 588 So. 2d 367, 368-69.
77. Id. at 368.
78. Id.
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own jurisdiction to review the decisions of the DEQ.79
Specifically, the court found that judicial review of DEQ decisions
is an "exercise of original jurisdiction" and that DEQ decisions are
"civil matters."80 As such, the court held the statutory language
granting it jurisdiction to review DEQ decisions failed the
constitutional muster of article V.81 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
however, found that judicial review of agency decisions
constituted an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, not original
jurisdiction. 82 Additionally, it found that DEQ decisions were not
"civil matters" and that in the context of administrative hearings,
the DEQ and the state could not be considered "defendants" in
matters arising from an application process before a regulatory
agency.
83
79. Id. at 368-69.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 369-70. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished Bowen
v. Doyal, 253 So. 2d 200 (1971), an earlier case which held that "district courts
exercise original jurisdiction when they review determinations of administrative
agencies," by noting that the 1921 Constitution (in force at the time of Bowen)
endowed district courts with only original jurisdiction, except in limited cases of
reviewing decisions of courts of limited jurisdiction and justice of the peace
courts. The American Waste court reasoned that it was thus a matter of necessity
for the Bowen court to characterize the review of agency decisions as an exercise
of original jurisdiction, writing:
Confronted with those provisions in the 1921 Louisiana Constitution, and
recognizing, in the absence of any constitutional mandate to the contrary,
that the district courts should be permitted to review administrative
agency determination, the Bowen court chose to construe what was
actually appellate review of agency determinations as "original
jurisdiction."
Id. at 370. At any rate, the court did leave open the possibility that where the
legislature specifically has provided for the article V courts to review agency
decisions de novo, such review may be an exercise of original, rather than
appellate, jurisdiction. Id. For an argument that the American Waste court's
reliance on the 1974 Constitution to characterize its jurisdiction as appellate may
have been misplaced, see Marcello, supra note 1, at 224-25 (noting that there is
no evidence in the debate transcripts suggesting an "intent to characterize a district
court's review of non-judicial, agency proceedings as an exercise of the district
court's 'appellate' jurisdiction").
83. American Waste, 588 So. 2d at 373. The court rejected the First Circuit's
argument that Louisiana Constitution article V, section 16(A) required the district
court to exercise original jurisdiction of the matter because the state is a defendant.
The court reasoned,
In this type of case, neither party is a "defendant," whether in court or
before the DEQ. The appellant and appellee in the reviewing court come
to the court of appeal from the first instance tribunal in which they were
1329
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The most substantive aspect of American Waste is its
discussion regarding whether appeals of DEQ decisions constitute
civil matters under the meaning of article V. 84 The court revealed
that history determines whether administrative rulings are civil
matters. 85 The rulings, the court said, are civil matters where the
issue that gave rise to the hearing was a traditional civil matter at
the adoption of the 1974 constitution and would have been handled
by the judicial branch at that time.86  With respect to the DEQ
permit cases at issue, the court found that they were not civil
matters "because waste disposal and water discharge permitting
did not exist as a traditional civil matter in 1974 and has never
been delegated in the first instance to the judicial branch, and
because such matters were thereafter constitutionally delegated by
the Legislature to the DEQ within the executive branch.,
8 7
One year prior to adopting the history-based framework of
American Waste, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided a seminal
case in which it invalidated a legislative attempt to divest district
courts of jurisdiction. In Moore v. Roemer, one of the most well-
recognized and oft-cited cases in the realm of Louisiana
administrative law, the court addressed the legislature's attempt to
grant the Office of Worker's Compensation Administration
(OWCA) the exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate workers'
simply applicant for permit and state regulatory agency .... Therefore,
that constitutional provision does not confer original jurisdiction in this
type of case in the district courts.
Id.
84. Like its meaning in the other forty-nine states, the term "civil" in
Louisiana can be a distinction between legal matters that are not criminal in
nature. Additionally, however, it can be a reference to the private law matters
governed by Louisiana's Civil Code, or more generally, Louisiana's civil law
system. In the context addressed here, however, "civil" refers to the former
meaning, a distinction from those matters defined by criminal statute. See LA.
CONST. art. V, § 16(A) ("[A] district court shall have Jurisdiction of all civil and
criminal matters." (emphasis added)). See also Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75
(La. 1990) ("La. Const. art. V, §16(A) uses the term 'civil' in direct contrast to
'criminal' matters. This terminology indicates an intent by the drafters to include
all matters not criminal in nature as 'civil matters' under the district court's
original jurisdiction.").
85. American Waste, 588 So. 2d at 371-72.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 373.
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compensation claims. 8 8 Noting that the district courts heard the
claims "from [the] inception [of worker's compensation] through
the Constitutional Convention of 1974," the court concluded that
the claims were civil matters under the meaning of article V.89 It
therefore held the legislature's attempt to "divest the district courts
of original jurisdiction over workers' compensation claims" to be
unconstitutional.9" Subsequent to the decision, the legislature
proposed a constitutional amendment, approved by the voters,
which granted the OWCA original jurisdiction over workers'
compensation claims.
In Pope v. State, the Louisiana Supreme Court also found an
unconstitutional grant of jurisdiction to an administrative agency.
91
In Pope, the court considered a statute that empowered the
Department of Corrections (DOC) to adopt an internal
administrative procedure for the handling of tort claims by
inmates.92 The Louisiana Corrections Administrative Remedy Act
(CARP) provided, inter alia, that the DOC or sheriff could adopt
exclusive "administrative remedy procedure[s] for receiving,
hearing, and disposing of complaints and grievances," as well as
personal injury and medical malpractice claims brought by inmates
of their respective correctional facilities. 93 Although the statute
provided that an offender could appeal the decisions in favor of the
DOC to the 19th Judicial District Court, it limited the review to
oral argument, "based on the record" created in "the administrative
remedy proceeding."94 Moreover, the statute authorized the court
to "reverse or modify the decision only for limited reasons
enumerated in the statute," such as "arbitrar or capricious
behavior, abuse of discretion and manifest error."
88. 567 So. 2d at 77.
89. Id. at 80. The court's reasoning at least in part hinged on the fact that it
found worker's compensation claims to be a matter of private law, rather than
public law. For a more thorough examination of Moore v. Roemer and
particularly the private law distinction, see John Devlin, Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 51 LA. L. REV. 295, 313-18 (1990).
90. Moore, 567 So. 2d at 77.
91. 792 So. 2d 713 (La. 2001).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 715-16 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1177 (2008)).
94. Id. at 716.
95. Id.
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The court in Pope concluded without discussion that a tort
action is "clearly a civil matter.' '96 It did, however, back up its
conclusion with a nod to the American Waste decision, writing,
"[m]oreover, the district courts historically have exercised original
jurisdiction in tort actions as civil matters, and were doing so when
the 1974 Constitution was adopted., 97  The court also invoked
American Waste to note that the statute there at issue was "vastly
different from statutes granting original jurisdiction to an
administrative agency in tort actions, even those in which the
government is the alleged tortfeasor."98  Although the court
defined its decision in terms of tort actions being civil matters, it
probably could have distinguished American Waste better by
focusing on the provision of article V, section 16(A) that grants
exclusive original jurisdiction to district courts in matters in which
the state is a defendant.
99
After this examination of the types of constitutional challenges
facing agencies, this Primer considers the primary functions of
administrative law and their operation.
III. PRIMARY FuNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It should not be surprising to find that in Louisiana's discussion
of administrative law, statutes of an individual agency vis-a-vis the
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act (LAPA) are construed in
accordance with the maxim: the specific controls over the general.
In administrative law, the more specific laws are those which
govern a particular agency; those specific laws control "over the
more general laws of the LAPA or of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure."' 00  This means that unlike the Code of Civil
Procedure, which mandates what procedure is required to reach a
96. Id. at 717.
97. Id. at 719.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. The American Waste court was able to sidestep this provision by
characterizing the parties in that case not as plaintiff and defendant, but as
applicant for permit and state regulatory agency. In re Am. Waste & Pollution
Control, 588 So. 2d 367, 368-69 (La. 1991). In tort actions, it would be difficult
to classify the parties as anything other than plaintiff and defendant.
100. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. La. Ins. Rating Comm'n, 696 So. 2d 1021, 1027
(La. App. I st Cir. 1997).
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particular result, the LAPA functions in a suppletive manner,
"fill[ing] in the gaps" "[w]here agency laws are silent."''
1
The LAPA generally segregates the primary functions of
administrative law into two categories: (1) adjudication, involving
litigating the rights and obligations of an individual within a
regulated group, and (2) rulemaking, the right of an agency to
proscribe rules of conduct or procedure for the regulated group as a
whole. However, this cabining of agency actions as either
adjudication or rulemaking is subject to critique. Professor Arthur
Bonfield noted that "some issues of specific fact that emerge in
rulemaking may be only satisfactorily resolved through the use of
essentially adjudicatory procedures, and some issues of general
fact that emerge in an adjudication should be resolved wholly
through the use of rulemaking procedures."' 0 2  This clash of
functions and procedural mechanisms reveals itself further in
subpart C of this section, which involves the challenges faced by
licensing boards.
A. Adjudication
While administrative "courts" consider issues of fact and law
and issue decisions and orders, they do not exercise judicial power
in the same sense as courts set up by article V of the Louisiana
Constitution. The Louisiana Supreme Court has characterized
administrative agencies as "governmental hybrid[s that] exercise
powers similar to those exercised by all three branches of our
government."'
10 3
Recognizing the legislatively-created, quasi-judicial, quasi-
executive function of administrative agencies, the question arises
as to what role agency adjudication plays in the development of
Louisiana's administrative law. Prior to 1996, the answer clearly
involved an agency policy-making function. 0 4  Administrative
101. Id.
102. Arthur E. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72
VA. L. REv. 297, 309. Bonfield later counters that the distinction may be
necessary to cabin the excessive costs involved in invalidating agency actions
because of the use of incorrect procedures. Id. at 311.
103. Wooley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005).
104. For discussion of the issues resulting from Louisiana's adoption of the
central panel system, see Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence and
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agencies hired their own administrative law judges, who could be
hired and fired pursuant to the same civil restrictions as other
agency employees and often had a level of expertise in the
agency's field. 105 As issues arose for adjudication, the hearing
process provided an impetus for agencies to bring enforcement
actions and establish policy. 1
06
In 1995 (effective in 1996), however, the legislature began to
alter the structure of Louisiana's administrative law system and
lessened the policy-making function of adjudications through two
basic reforms. 10 7  First, the legislature created the Division of
Administrative Law (DAL), a central panel of administrative law
judges (ALJs).108 Administrative law judges serve as employees of
the Department of State Civil Service and are not subject to
supervision by the agencies for which they adjudicate.109 Indeed,
subject to the determination of the Department of Civil Service,
they may rotate from one type of agency hearing to another."
l 0
Second, by amendment in 1999, the legislature decreed that "no
agency or official thereof ... shall be entitled to judicial review of
a decision made pursuant to this chapter [by administrative law
judges]."'' Thus, administrative agencies cannot appeal ALJ
decisions with which they disagree. 12 Nor can they independently
act to circumvent the effect of an ALJ ruling. In its restructuring
of the state's administrative law, the legislature declared that
agencies have no authority to override an ALJ's decision or order,
despite the fact that administrative proceedings are sub-judicial. 113
These legislative changes are a source of great controversy.' 14
Proponents of the new structure argue that the independence of
Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana's Administrative
Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REv. 431 (1999).
105. Id. at 432-33.
106. Id. at 460-61.
107. See id at 455-66. See also infra Part III.B.1.
108. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:991 (2008); 1995 La. Acts No. 739.
109. See Bybee, supra note 104, at 453.
110. Id, at433.
111. § 49:992(B)(3); 1999 La. Acts No. 1332.
112. See generally Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 893 So. 2d 746
(La. 2005).
113. § 49:992(B)(2).
114. See Bybee, supra note 104, at 459-60.
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ALJs encourages both better decisions and orders, as well as more
public respect for agency rulings."n5 Opponents, on the other hand,
insist that the new structure leads to a feeble state executive."1
6
Without commenting here on the virtues of the new system, it is
clear that the changes represent a significant shift in the law.
The structural changes, however, do not apply across the board
to strip all agencies of the pre-revision power they enjoyed to
handle adjudications."17 In its adoption of the DAL central panel
system, the legislature explicitly exempted a significant number of
agencies from the application of the new structure, effectively
allowing them to continue to employ their own administrative law
judges." 8  Thus, the broad principles of the statutes governing
adjudications in 1995 warrant discussion here as they continue to
apply to those agencies exempted from the DAL.
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:955 et seq. sets forth the
principles governing traditional administrative hearings. This
section discusses the provisions of those statutes in the following
six contexts: (1) the right to hearings and the basic rights afforded
to parties subjected to agency hearings; (2) the limited scope of
subject matter jurisdiction within adjudications; (3) the duties and
responsibilities of the agency, its members, and/or its presiding
officers; (4) evidentiary standards; (5) ensuring agency review of
the facts and law of a particular case; and (6) reconsideration,
review, and rehearing of agency decisions and orders.
To the extent that the analysis of these six aspects of
administrative hearings differs for adjudications handled by the
DAL, this section notes the differences within the appropriate
subsection.
115. See Marcello, supra note 1, at 220. Although the author explicitly resists
providing his personal opinion of the creation of the DAL, he offers a brief outline
of the proponents of the new system. Id.
116. See Bybee, supra note 104.
117. See § 49:992(D).
118. Specifically, the statute exempts the following boards and agencies from
having its adjudicatory jurisdiction given to the DAL: (1) those which federal law
provides must consider or render a final order in an adjudication proceeding; the
Office of Workers' Compensation; (2) the Office of Insurance Administration; (3)
professional and occupational licensing boards; (4) the Department of Agriculture
and Forestry; (5) adjudications by the Assistant Secretary of the Office of
Conservation; and (6) the Public Service Commission. § 49:992(D)(2)-(8).
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1. Right to Hearings
The LAPA, adopted in 1967 and modeled after the 1961 Model
State Administrative Procedure Act,1 19 affords parties subject to
administrative adjudication the right to a hearing as well as notice
thereof unless the parties have waived their rights. 12 0 At hearings
held under the statutes of the LAPA, all parties have the right to
present evidence on issues of fact and make arguments on issues of
law. 2 1 Findings of fact are only to derive from the evidence and
matters officially noticed in the adjudication. 1
22
Like trials of civil matters in courts set up by article V of the
Louisiana Constitution, informal disposition can resolve disputes
(be it by stipulation, settlement, consent order, or default), so long
as the law does not provide otherwise. 1
23
Not all state agency action, however, brings with it the
entitlements of an LAPA hearing. The Act defines "adjudication"
as "agency process for the formulation of a decision or order."'
12 4
Moreover, it defines "decision" or "order" as "the final disposition
... of any agency, in any manner other than rulemaking, required
by constitution or statute to be determined on the record [only]
after notice and opportunity for an agency hearing."'125 It follows
from these definitions that unless an agency conducts a hearing,
which by definition necessarily results in a decision or order, it is
not adjudication under the LAPA. 126 Where agency action does
119. § 49:950-72.
120. § 49:955(A). Generally, the notice must inform the party of the time,
place and nature of the hearing, include a statement of authority and jurisdiction,
reference the statutes and rules involved, and provide a "short and plain" statement





125. § 49:951(3) (emphasis added).
126. See generally Gov't Computer Sales, Inc. v. State, 720 So. 2d 53 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the denial of a state contract by the state did not
constitute an adjudication under the LAPA). In that case, an unsuccessful bidder
on a state contract alleged entitlement to a hearing before the Division of
Administrative Law for consideration of its protest of the award of the contract to
the lowest bidder. Id. at 55. The court found no property right in the bidder's
interest that would trigger a constitutional claim for a hearing. Id. at 57.
Additionally, the statutes provided only for the aggrieved bidder to protest the
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not fall under the LAPA definition of adjudication, the rights
associated with an LAPA hearing do not apply.
In Caracci v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, for
example, horse owners sought to enjoin racing stewards from
further investigating the qualifications of their horse without full
due process standards being granted to them. 12 The Court found,
however, that the due process protections of the LAPA did not
apply to the actions of the racing stewards because such actions
"do not fall under the definition of 'adjudication' so as to require
application of the [Louisiana] Administrative Procedure Act."
' 28
Additionally, in Government Computer Sales, Inc. v. State, the
plaintiff, GCSI, was an unsuccessful bidder for a state computer
contract and invoked the LAPA to request a hearing before an ALJ
to challenge the qualifications of the winning bidder. 2 9 When the
Office of State Purchasing refused to grant the hearing, GCSI
again invoked the LAPA to seek judicial review of the refusal of
the Office of State Purchasing to grant it a hearing on the merits of
the contract. 130 However, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal noted that the LAPA and the Division of Administrative
Law Act "merely set forth the procedures to be followed if a
hearing is required by the constitution or statutory authority under
which the agency is acting."'' Finding that GCSI had neither a
statutory right to a hearing under the procurement code nor a
property right which would trigger a constitutional requirement for
a hearing, the first circuit concluded, "[b]ecause disposition of the
protest by the Office of State Purchasing does not constitute an
'adjudication' as defined by the [L]APA, the provisions of the
Division of Administrative Law Act do not apply and a hearing...
is not required."'
' 32
award of the contract to the lowest bidder to the procurement officer of the Office
of State Purchasing. Id. at 58.
127. 556 So. 2d 1249 (La. 1990).
128. Id. at 1250.
129. 720 So. 2d at 55.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 56.
132. Id. at 58.
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2. Limited Scope of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The subject matter jurisdiction of administrative hearings is not
as plenary as that exercised by the article V courts. In Albe v.
Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation, for example, the
Louisiana Supreme Court struck down the Office of Worker's
Compensation Administration (OWC) determination that the
statutory denial of medical treatment to an incarcerated claimant
for benefits violated his constitutional due process rights.' 
33
Citing the "overwhelming weight" of jurisprudential authority,
the court held that "[iun general, administrative agencies lack the
power to hold statutory provisions unconstitutional.' 34  In its
discussion of the case, the court noted that state agencies do not
enjoy judicial power, which article V of the Louisiana Constitution
vests specifically in the Louisiana Supreme Court, the courts of
appeal, and the district courts. 135 Judicial review, according to the
court, "represents the highest exercise of judicial power .... Thus
... ministerial officers cannot question the constitutionality of the
statute under which they operate."'
136
3. Deciding Authority: Agency Members and Presiding
Officer; ALJs
The LAPA provides for several duties and responsibilities of
the agency or its subordinate presiding officer of administrative
proceedings. 37 An agency or its presiding officer has the general
power to regulate the course of the hearings, including the power
to set the time and place for hearings, fix the time for filing briefs,
and direct the parties to consider the simplification of the issues.
138
The presidinF officer also has the power to administer oaths and
affirmations. 39
133. 700 So. 2d 824 (La. 1997).
134. Id. at 827.
135. LA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
136. Albe, 700 So. 2d at 828-29.
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Another key function of the agency or its presiding officer is to
issue subpoenas in the name of the agency. 14  The subpoenas can
require a person to attend and provide testimony at a hearing and
compel the production of documentary evidence. 14 ' Although the
agency does not have the power to hold those who refuse to
comply with agency-issued subpoenas in contempt, the LAPA
does give presiding officers the enforcement mechanism of
applying to the court of the district where the disobeying person
resides or can be found. 142 Upon the agency's issuance of proper
proof, the district judge can then issue an order to enforce the
requirements of the agency-issued summons and punish a person
for default or disobedience.
1 43
The LAPA provides that agency members and presiding
officers cannot serve in proceedings in which they are unable to
give the parties a fair and impartial hearing. 44 Additionally, the
LAPA delineates the procedures by which any party can request
the removal of an agency member or presiding officer on the
ground of his inability to provide a fair and impartial hearing.
14 5
With respect to adjudications handled by the DAL,
administrative law judges function as the rough equivalent of the
presiding officer.146 The DAL itself has a hierarchical structure,
summarized by the Louisiana Supreme Court as follows:
The DAL shall commence and handle all adjudications in
the manner required by the LAPA, that the ALJ shall issue
the final decision or order and the agency shall have no
authority to override the decision or order, that the
governor shall appoint, and the Senate confirm, a director





144. § 49:960(B). This same standard applies to AL~s hearing adjudications
under the DAL. § 49:999. In such cases, after a party has requested the
disqualification of an administrative law judge, the director "shall promptly
determine whether or not to disqualify an administrative law judge based on the
request, or alternatively, he may hold a preliminary hearing at least ten calendar
days prior to the hearing date for the purpose of receiving evidence relating to the
grounds alleged for disqualification." § 49:999(B)(2).
145. § 49:960(B).
146. See § 49:994(D)(3).
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current ALJs employed by the various affected agencies
shall be transferred to and employed in the DAL. 1
47
The statutes set forth the requisite qualifications for ALJs
148
and additionally vest them with the authority to regulate
adjudicatory proceedings, issue decisions and orders, and exercise
the above mentioned powers vested in the presiding officers of
adjudications. 149  The LAPA additionally vests the director with
broad administrative power over the DAL. 150
4. Evidentiary Standards
The Louisiana Code of Evidence does not apply to
adjudications unless the legislature or the agency requires it for
specific proceedings. Section 956 of the LAPA sets forth the rules
of evidence in adjudications. Generally, the section provides for a
relaxed evidentiary standard that allows agencies to admit evidence
"which possesses probative value commonly accepted by
147. Wooley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 928 So. 2d 746, 761 (La.
2005).
148. Each administrative law judge employed by the division must be a
resident of Louisiana, be licensed to practice law in Louisiana, and have practiced
law for at least five years prior to his appointment. § 49:994(A). The LAPA sets
forth the same requirements for the director of the DAL. § 495(A). For an in
depth look at the Division of Administrative Law through the eyes of its current
director, see Ann Wise, The Division of Administrative Law, Louisiana's
Independent Administrative Hearings Agency, 68 LA. L. REv. 1169 (2008).
149. § 49:994(D). Additionally, the statute gives the ALJ the power to conduct
adjudications or conference by telephone or video conference, so long as the
parties do not object. § 49:994(D)(4). Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:998
also grants administrative law judges the power to conduct prehearing conferences
for the purpose of dealing with, inter alia, settlement possibilities, stipulations,
clarification of issues, objections to proffers of evidence, and schedules for the
submission of written briefs. § 49:998. The AU may conduct the prehearing
conference on his own motion or that of any party. Id. Additionally, the ALJ
must set the time and place of the prehearing conference, and gives reasonable
notice to the parties of the conference. Id.
150. The director's responsibilities include, inter alia, the organization of the
division into appropriate sections, the assignment of administrative law judges, the
development and maintenance of a training program for ALJs, the keeping of
records, and the supervision of adjudications. § 49:996.
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reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs."'' This
standard allows for the admission of hearsay evidence.' 
52
Additionally, the LAPA expressly delineates situations under
which evidence not always admissible in the district courts is
acceptable in administrative adjudications. 153  For instance, all
documentary evidence offered by the agency may be in the form of
copies or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference.'
54
Additionally, the Act cites the interests of efficiency to allow for
evidence to be received in written form when doing so does not
substantially prejudice the parties. 1 5 Finally, the Act allows for
notice of both judicially cognizable facts as well as generally
recognized technical or scientific facts within the agency's
specialized knowledge. 1
56
The agency, its presiding officer, or any party to a proceeding
can depose witnesses and conduct discovery to the extent that such
is allowed in civil actions.' 57 All such depositions are admissible
in the administrative proceedings.
58
Though the Act relaxes the evidentiary standard applied in
courts set up by article V of the Louisiana constitution, certain
restrictions nonetheless apply to administrative hearings. 159 First,
the statutes compel agencies to recognize the privileges created by
law.160 Additionally, they provide that agencies "may exclude
incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and repetitious evidence."'
161
Despite the statutory language that suggests exclusion of
incompetent evidence is not compulsory, jurisprudence holds that
incompetent evidence is inadmissible in agency hearings. 62 The
151. § 49:956(1).
152. See generally Spreadbury v. State, 745 So. 2d 1204, 1208 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1999) ("It is clear that the usual rules of evidence need not apply in










162. See Superior Bar & Grill v. State, 655 So. 2d 468 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995)
(holding that where that an undercover and alleged underage confidential
informant did not testify, her parents did not testify, her birth certificate and
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Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted a case-by-case "facts and
circumstances" test to determine whether, in the context of
administrative hearings, hearsay can be regarded as competent
evidence. 163 The formula generally qualifies hearsay as competent
"provided that the evidence has some degree of reliability and
trustworthiness and is of the type that reasonable persons would
rely on."
164
The jurisprudence is unclear as to whether the residuum rule
applies to hearsay evidence in Louisiana agency proceedings. The
overarching principle of the residuum rule is that while hearsay
evidence generally may be used in administrative hearings, it
cannot form the sole basis of the decision resulting from the
adjudication. 165  The Louisiana Supreme Court, however, has
never held that the residuum rule must apply to direct the outcome
of agency adjudications, and the rule has not received universal
acceptance within the state's appellate courts. In Germany v.
State, for example, the second circuit upheld the Department of
Health and Human Resource's admission of out-of-court
statements taken from a school bus driver to determine residency
issues. 166 The court ruled that "it is... clear from the [L]APA and
interpretive jurisprudence that hearsay is admissible in the instant
cause in determining the ultimate issue."
167
Finally, certain documents and records that qualify as
"confidential and privileged" under the LAPA are not subject
driver's license were not introduced, and the police officer conducting the
investigation did not testify as to her age, there was no competent evidence to
support the contention that she was too young to operate the video poker machines
at a bar and grill).
163. Chaisson v. Cajun Bag & Supply Co., 708 So. 2d 375, 381-82 (La. 1998).
164. Spreadbury v. State, 745 So. 2d 1204 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1999) (discussing
Chaisson, 708 So. 2d at 381-83).
165. See Rothbard v. Gerace, 354 So. 2d 225, 226 (La. 4th Cir. 1978) (citing
Toliver v. Doyal, 297 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974); Gardere v. Brown, 170
So. 2d 758 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964)) (discussing the residuum rule). The first
circuit noted that many Louisiana intermediate appellate decisions have followed
the rule, but ultimately concluded the rule was inapplicable to the case at hand.
166. 493 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
167. Id. at 805. Somewhat contradictorily, however, after finding that the
hearsay statements were admissible, the court in Germany found that the agency's
use of it to deny the plaintiffs welfare compensation was manifestly erroneous
because there were "too many other plausible explanations" for the school bus
driver picking up the child at the residence in question. Id.
1342 [Vol. 68
2008] LOUISIANA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. A PRIMER 1343
either to being made available at the hearing or to being
subpoenaed. 168  In addition to where otherwise specifically
exempted by statute, the LAPA limits such exemptions to "private
contracts, geological and geophysical information and data, trade
secrets and commercial or financial data, which are obtained by an
agency through a voluntary agreement between the agency and any
person . . . [and] designated as confidential by the parties when
obtained.' 169  To promote obedience to the privileged and
confidential provisions of the LAPA, the Act waives the state's
sovereign immunity from suit for damage resulting from improper
disclosures.
170
While there is no significant difference between the evidentiary
standards of adjudications handled by agencies and those handled
by the DAL, it is worth noting that in the case of the latter, the
statutes grant the director of the division the power to "[d]evelop
uniform standards, rules of evidence, and procedures . . . to
regulate the conduct of adjudications."''
1
5. Ensuring Agency Review of Evidence and Arguments
Several provisions of the LAPA seek to ensure that an agency
considers the evidence and arguments on the record before
rendering a decision adverse to a party other than the agency
itself.172  This subsection first discusses the substantive
requirements that the LAPA places on agencies to give
consideration to individual cases before rendering a final decision
or order.' 73 It then examines LAPA requirements of what must
compile the records of administrative hearings. 174
168. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:956(8)(a) (2008).
169. § 49:956(8)(b). Louisiana Revised Statutes section 956 does allow for
certain agencies related to healthcare to make available and use records and
documents which otherwise would be deemed confidential or privileged, provided
that any medical or patient records are altered to conceal the identity of the patient.
§ 49:956(8)(d).
170. § 49:956(8)(c).
171. § 49:996(6) (emphasis added).
172. Many of such provisions may be waived by written stipulation.
Additionally, the agency may eliminate the requirements in the event that there is
no contest. See id. §§ 49:957-58.
173. See infra Part III.A(5)(a).
174. See infra Part III.A(5)(b).
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
a. Requirements ofAgency Review of Facts and Law
In cases where a majority of the decision-rendering officials of
the agency have not heard the case or read the record, the decision
cannot be made final until the agency does two things.' 75 First, it
must serve the proposed order on the parties. 176 Along with the
proposed order, the agency must also give the adversely affected
parties a statement of the factual findings, as well as the reasons
for its decision.' 77 A person who heard the case or read the entire
record must prepare the statement. 178 Second, it must give the
adversely affected parties the opportunity to file exceptions,
present briefs, and make oral arguments to the decision-rendering
members of the agency.' 79 The agency must follow the same two
steps in cases where someone other than a member of the agency
prepares the order.18
0
Additionally, the final decision or order must be in writing or
stated in the record. 181  Where statutory language delineates
requisite findings of fact for the agency to make an adverse ruling,
it must justify its findings of fact with a concise and explicit
statement supporting the findings.' 82  The agency shall notify
parties of its decision or order in person or by mail. 83 Upon
request, a copy of the decision or order shall be mailed to each
party and his attorney. 1
84
Significantly, the LAPA prohibits improper entanglement
between the decision-rendering members of the agency and the
parties to the adjudication, including those performing
investigatory or prosecutorial functions.'18 Specifically, unless
notice has been served and all parties have had the opportunity to
participate in the discussion, the decision-rendering members











185. See § 49:960(A).
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manner. 186  The court in Allen v. Louisiana State Board of
Dentistry, for example, overturned the Board's ten-year suspension
of a dentist's license after finding insufficient separation of
functions between the fact finder and the prosecutor.' 87  There,
although the Board made the decision as to the question of guilt,
the office of the prosecutor drafted the findings of fact.'
88
In the context of the DAL, the LAPA provides that the director
of the DAL shall take certain steps to evaluate the performance of
the central panel ALJs. 189 Specifically, the director is to focus on
the three areas of competence, productivity, and demeanor in
evaluating the judicial performance of the ALJs. 190 Although the
evaluation is not to include a review of any result from a
proceeding heard by the ALJ, 19 1 the statutes order the director to
take comments from randomly selected litigants and lawyers who
have appeared before the particular ALJ under evaluation.'
92
b. Composition of the Record
The LAPA also imposes basic requirements for what must
comprise the records of adjudications. 193  All pleadings and
motions must go into the record. 194 Additionally, the Act stresses
that the record must include rulings, decisions, and opinions of the
186. Id. If such communication is required for the disposition of ex parte
matters authorized by law, the communication between the decision-making
members and the parties and their representatives is not strictly prohibited as in
other cases. Id.
187. 543 So. 2d 908, 915 (La. 1989).
188. Id.
189. § 49:997.
190. § 49:997(B). The statute provides for the evaluation of the three areas of
competence, productivity, and demeanor to include consideration of the following:
(1) Industry and promptness in adhering to schedules. (2) Tolerance,
courtesy, patience, attentiveness, and self-control in dealing with
litigants, witnesses, and counsel and in presiding over adjudications. (3)
Legal skills and knowledge of the law and new legal developments. (4)
Analytical talents and writing abilities. (5) Settlement skills. (6)
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presiding officer of the hearing. 195 Likewise, the record generally
must contain the evidence introduced and considered at the
hearing, including a statement of matters officially noticed. 96 The
agency must insert into the record all offers of proof, objections,'
97
proposed findings, and exceptions.'
98
Parties to a proceeding can request that the agency prepare and
produce a transcript of the hearing for their review.199 Normally, the
requesting party must pay the cost of the transcript.200 However, the
statute creates an exception in such cases where the governing
statute provides that the record be furnished without cost.20 1
6. Rehearing
In cases where the agency decision or order is in clear
contravention of the law, or where a party discovers new evidence
or issues not previously considered, the adjudication may be
subject to rehearing, reopening, or reconsideration by the
agency. 2 2 Such action must take place within ten days from the
date of the entry of the original order or decision.
20 3
Parties must institute such actions for rehearing,
reconsideration, or review by setting forth the grounds justifying
the action.204 The ground on which the agency grants the action









202. § 49:959(A) ("A decision or order in a case of adjudication shall be
subject to rehearing, reopening, or reconsideration by the agency, within ten days
from the date of its entry. The grounds for such action shall be either that: (1) The
decision or order is clearly contrary to the law and the evidence; (2) The party has
discovered since the hearing evidence important to the issues which he could not
have with due diligence obtained before or during the hearing; (3) There is a
showing that issues not previously considered ought to be examined in order
properly to dispose of the matter; or (4) There is other good ground for further
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B. Rulemaking
"One wonders what would happen in a society in which there
were no rules to break. Doubtless everyone would quickly die of
boredom." Susan Howitch, Author
1. Current State of the Function of Rulemaking
For many reasons, such as political import or difficulty in
enacting statutory changes through the legislative process, an
executive agency may choose to create policy by adopting
standards in individual adjudications and then applying those
standards consistently to subsequent adjudications. 2°6  In 1999,
(now) Judge Jay S. Bybee remarked that legislative changes to
administrative law have "effectively cut off adjudication as a
means for agencies to establish policy. °2 0 7 He further predicted
that agencies would "adopt more regulations and more specific
regulations as a means of cabining ALJs' discretion."2 8 One of
the ways that an agency can limit the discretion of an ALJ is to
limit, or eliminate, the ALJ's ability to find certain facts. For
example, in Heckler v. Campbell, the United States Supreme Court
found that the Department of Health and Human Services could
eliminate the discretion of an ALJ to determine whether a claimant
206. For example, the National Labor Relations Board, operating in the setting
of labor-management relations under which judicial review patterns can vary
depending on the pro- or anti-union status of a particular area, "hardly ever
engages in rulemaking about its regulatory concerns." PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL.,
GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 566 (10th ed. 2003). See also
Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 522 U.S. 359,
374 (1998) (finding that the NLRB, "uniquely among major federal administrative
agencies, has chosen to promulgate virtually all the legal rules in its field though
adjudication rather than rulemaking").
207. Bybee, supra note 104, at 460. Judge Bybee, now serving on the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, was a professor at the LSU Paul M. Hebert
Law Center from 1991-1998.
208. Id. The Louisiana Constitution mandates publicly accessible, codified
agency law, encompassing, "rules, regulations, and procedures adopted by all state
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, boards, and commissions." LA.
CONST. art. XII, § 14. For a discussion of this "innovation" in the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution, see Marcello, supra note 1, at 187-88. For a further discussion of
the importance of public access to an increasingly administrative state, see
Christopher B. McNeil, The Public's Right of Access to "'Some Kind of
Hearing"--Creating Policies that Protect the Right to Observe Agency Hearings,
68 LA. L. REv. 1121 (2008).
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was considered "disabled" for the purpose of receiving Social
Security disability benefits.20 9  The claimant argued that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services should have made an
individualized determination of her ability to participate in a job in
the national economy; the Secretary, however, relied on
standardized determinations promulgated by rule.2 10  Under the
regulations, if Campbell could participate in a job in the national
economy, she was not disabled; the agency created a medical-
vocational matrix to determine the availability and number of jobs
available.
211
The Court found that although the Social Security Act
contemplated individual determinations of disability based on
hearings, the Secretary could "rely[] on rulemaking to resolve
certain classes of issues . . . that do not require case by case
consideration. ' 212 In Heckler, the "class of issues" was the
determination of the types and number of jobs available in the
national economy, and that it was not necessary to litigate the
213availability or existence of those jobs in each case. Upholding
these regulations took away the power of an individual ALJ to
determine whether there was a job in the national economy for any
given claimant. Thus, the Court upheld the agency's use of
rulemaking to alter the fact-finding power of an ALJ.
Judge Bybee was commenting, of course, on changes made to
the LAPA in 1995, which created the DAL central panel system,
removing administrative law judges from the purview of particular
agencies and placing them in a central office where ALJs rotate
209. 461 U.S. 458,470 (1983).
210. Id. at 461-62. The Department of Health and Human Services developed
the guidelines after continued critique of the use of vocational experts in
individual cases that led to inconsistent results among similarly situated disability
applicants. Id. at 461. The ALJ, based on the promulgated medical-vocational
guidelines, determined that Campell was not disabled; this determination was
affirmed by the Social Security Appeals Council and the district court reviewing
the case. Id. at 463.
211. Id. at468.
212. Id. at467.
213. Id. at 468. In Louisiana, courts have followed the principles in Heckler to
defer to the Social Security Administration's rules regarding the amount of weight
to be given to particular medical testimony. See generally Albert v. Barnhart, No.
03-1166, 2004 WL 385055 (E.D. La. 2004).
1348 [Vol. 68
2008] LOUISIANA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. A PRIMER 1349
between different types of cases.2 1 4 Judge Bybee's concern was
one of practical significance given the legislature's mandate that
decisions of an ALJ are unappeallable by an agency. 215  It was
logical to assume that removing policy-making adjudications from
the purview of an agency would push agencies more towards
policy-making through rulemaking.2 16  This likelihood was
strengthened by the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Wooley
v. State Farm, which found that decisions of ALJs, who do not
exercise judicial power, are not subject to enforcement, and do not
have the force of law.217 In 2005, the legislature reacted to Wooley
214. 1995 La. Acts No. 739 § 1. Proponents of the move towards the central
panel system argue that a professionally trained group of AL's can bring an air of
independence to the administrative adjudication process, and an end to ex parte
communication between agencies and ALJ's. See Marcello, supra note 1, at 220.
Opponents argue that the wide range of cases granted to ALJ's eliminates
specialization, and that deference to agency expertise may make little sense when
the adjudicatory decisions are made by an ALJ wholly unaffiliated with an agency.
Id. at 220-21.
215. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:992(B)(2) provides: "In an
adjudication commenced by the division, the administrative law judge shall issue
the final decision or order, whether or not on rehearing, and the agency shall have
no authority to override such decision or order." See also Marcello, supra note 1,
at 245 (referring to the unappealability of an ALJ's decision as part of the "ugly"
of administrative practice, in that it removes decision making "from the realm of
agency expertise and undermine[s] the administrative adjudication process.").
216. The choice between policy making through rulemaking or individual
adjudication lies in the "informed discretion of the agency." See SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); Bowie v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 627 So. 2d
164, 167-71 (La. 1993) (finding that the Louisiana Public Service Commission's
discretion to choose policy making through adjudication or generally applicable
rulemaking requires that the Commission set standards applicable to transfers of
closely held stock either through precedents created by reasoned opinions in
individual adjudications or by rulemaking resulting in written standards or
guidelines). For an argument that federal agency law has moved in the opposite
direction, see Justice Antonin Scalia, The APA, The D. C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REv. 345, 376 (finding that the "most notable development
in federal government administration during the past two decades is . . . the
constant and accelerating flight away from individualized, adjudicatory
proceedings to generalized disposition through rulemaking").
217. 893 So. 2d 746 (La. 2005). The Wooley case, and its ramifications, have
been extensively covered in prior articles. See James Flanagan, An Update on
Developments in Central Panels and AL! Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REv.
401, 410 (2005); Ed Richards, Administrative Finality and the Pelican State: A
Recipe for Central Panel Gumbo, 30 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 4 (2005); April
Rolen-Ogden, Note, When Administrative Law Judges Rule the World. Wooley v.
State Farm-Does a Denial of Agency-Initiated Judicial Review of ALJ Final
Orders Violate the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 66 LA. L.
REv. 885 (2006).
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by requiring that "[u]pon the issuance of such a final decision or
order [issued by the ALJ], the agency or any official thereof shall
comply fully with the final order or decision of the administrative
law judge." 18 In effect, the legislature has required that an agency
follow the "non-judicial" mandate of an ALJ, which underlies the
Louisiana Supreme Court's reasoning for upholding the creation of
the DAL in the first place.
219
Furthermore, in Bonvillion v. Department of Insurance, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, relying on the Wooley
rationale of non-enforcement of ALJ decisions, refused to grant a
bail bond applicant's petition for mandamus (requiring the
Insurance Commissioner to renew his license) after an ALJ
overruled a decision by the Insurance Commission denying the
license renewal. 220  The Bonvillion decision was rendered on
February 16, 2005. Louisiana Acts 2005, No. 204 § 1, requiring
that an agency comply fully with the decision or order of an ALJ,
was approved by the legislature on June 29, 2005. Had Mr.
Bonvillion's case been pending during the passage of the Act, the
court may have reached the opposite result.
Wooley, the first circuit, and the legislature together have
created the next logical step for review by the Louisiana Supreme
Court-if an ALJ's decision is not enforceable because it is non-
judicial, but an agency must, according to the legislature, comply
fully with the decision, and a court refuses to issue mandamus
relying on Wooley, then what effect exactly does the non-
enforceable non-judicial decision of an ALJ have? This is
especially complicated given that enforcement of a regulatory
scheme still solidly belongs to the agency. In theory, an ALJ
cannot tell an agency that the agency cannot enforce a particular
penalty against a person, because enforcement is an executive
function. If an ALJ can tell an agency not to enforce a rule against
a particular person (say, through a declaratory judgment action,
which the court left open as a possibility in Wooley), and now the
agency "shall comply fully" with the order, then the non-judicial
ALJ clearly has encroached on an agency's executive function.
218. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:992 B(2) (2008); 2005 La. Acts No. 204, § 1.
219. See Rolen-Ogden, supra note 217, at 900.
220. 906 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005).
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2. The Rulemaking Process
Louisiana's rulemaking process fits (or, rather, sits, somewhat
uncomfortably) within the above-mentioned framework. The
LAPA procedure for the adoption of rules is set out in Louisiana
Revised Statutes sections 49:953 et seq. Rules, in the roughest
sense, are the policies and procedures used to run an agency and
the requirements that the agency imposes upon anyone whose
conduct the agency has the power to regulate.2 The LAPA
requires notice of intent to promulgate a rule and a reasonable
opportunity for interested persons to submit comments and
possibly appear before the agency if a rule is substantive in
nature. 222  However, if the group interested in submitting
comments or other argument is (1) at least twenty-five persons, (2)
a governmental agency, or (3) a committee of either house of the
legislature, the LAPA requires that the right to publicly submit
data or make other public comments or arguments be granted.223
The Louisiana requirement of mandatory public hearings to allow
comments in certain substantive instances stands in marked
contrast to the federal APA, which allows an agency to decide
whether or not all evidence submitted in a hearing will be in
written form, even if "formal" rulemaking is required. 2 4 Unlike
221. § 49:951(6) ("'Rule' means each agency statement, guide, or requirement
for conduct or action, exclusive of those regulating only the internal management
of the agency and those purporting to adopt, increase, or decrease any fees
imposed on the affairs, actions, or persons regulated by the agency, which has
general applicability and the effect of implementing or interpreting substantive law
or policy, or which prescribes the procedure or practice requirements of the
agency. 'Rule' includes, but is not limited to, any provision for fines, prices or
penalties, the attainment or loss of preferential status, and the criteria or
qualifications for licensure or certification by an agency. A rule may be of general
applicability even though it may not apply to the entire state, provided its form is
general and it is capable of being applied to every member of an identifiable class.
The term includes the amendment or repeal of an existing rule but does not include
declaratory rulings or orders or any fees.").
222. § 49:953(A). For a detailed discussion of the timetable for rule
promulgation, as well as its uncertainties through continual amendments to the
LAPA, see Marcello, supra note 1, at 198-99.
223. § 49:953(A)(2)(a).
224. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2006) ("In rule making . . . an agency may, when a
party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission of all or
part of the evidence in written form."). See also Long Island R.R. Co. v. United
States, 318 F. Supp. 490 (D.C.N.Y. 1970) (holding that section 556(d) allowed the
Interstate Commerce Commission to proceed with incentive charge hearings for
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the federal APA, Louisiana does not draw the same distinction
between formal rulemaking-where an agency's governing statute
requires rulemaking to be "on the record after notice and
hearing"--and informal "notice and comment" rulemaking.225 In
Louisiana, all rulemaking is accomplished through the "notice and
comment" procedure.
Emergency rules are generally exempted from the notice
requirement provided that the agency provides a statement of
reasons explaining the specific emergency.226 A broad statement
that a rule is necessary to protect the health, welfare, and safety of
the public, without more, has been found to be incomplete;
emergency promulgation requires a description of the facts and
circumstances that justify a conclusion of imminent peril. 2 7
The use of the emergency rulemaking procedure in Louisiana
is widespread. For example, by the time of the February 2008
Louisiana Law Review Symposium, over thirty emergency rules
had been promulgated awaiting codification in the Louisiana
22Register.228 Such "imminent peril" has been alleged by the
Department of Health and Hospitals, the Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, the Department of Revenue, the
Department of Social Services, and the Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries.229
rented freight cars on the basis of written submissions only, without oral hearing).
The court described the intersection of the requirements of formal rulemaking and
the ability to request only written evidence as: "What Congress gave by that
provision of the APA, it partially took away by another." Id. at 498.
225. The APA contemplates two types of rulemaking: (1) "formal rulemaking"
(§ 556), in which the parties are granted trial-type formal rights, and (2) "informal
rulemaking" (§ 553), which is commonly referred to as "notice and comment"
rulemaking. Notice and comment rulemaking is allowable under the APA unless
"rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing." § 503(c). The LAPA has no analogous provision to the federal
APA's formal rulemaking provision. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:950-72
(2008).
226. § 49:953 B.
227. Premier Games, Inc. v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 761 So. 2d
707 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
228. This refers only to rules that have already been filed with the Office of the
State Register within five days of adoption of the emergency rule. See Office of
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Given that policy-making through individual adjudication has
been hamstrung by the legislature and the Louisiana Supreme
Court, agencies are now pushed into the position of anticipating a
broad range of factual scenarios to arise in any particular agency
and attempting to resolve them prospectively through the
rulemaking process. Agencies can issue guidance documents,
including statements, guides, requirements, circulars, and
directives; however, if those documents constitute a rule, they are
invalid unless adopted pursuant to the procedures outlined in the
LAPA.23 °
In 1996, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal found that
a letter allegedly "clarifying" the Department of Revenue's
position in pending collection suits regarding components of
refinery gas was a "rule" subject to the LAPA. 231 In Star
Enterprise, the Department of Revenue and Taxation notified three
particular oil refineries that it would determine the taxable value of
a refinery gas component in a manner different from that
previously adopted by the Department and published in the
Louisiana Administrative Code. 232  The court rejected the
Department's characterization of the letter as "mere
correspondence," given that it was of general applicability to all
manufacturers of refinery gas and had the effect of implementing
substantive tax law.233
More recently, in 2006, the same court invalidated an
"advisory opinion" by the Louisiana State Board of Nursing
(LSBN) finding that it is within the scope of practice for a certified
registered nurse anesthetist (CRNA) to administer certain
230. § 49:962 ("Each agency shall provide by rule for the filing and prompt
disposition of petitions for declaratory orders and rulings as to the applicability of
any statutory provision or of any rule or order of the agency. Declaratory orders
and rulings shall have the same status as agency decisions or orders in adjudicated
cases.") See also § 49:963(C), (E) (allowing a court to invalidate any rule not
promulgated according to the LAPA and paragraph (E)); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.
v. La. Ins. Rating Comm'n, 696 So. 2d 1021, 1025-26 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997)
(finding that an "interpretive directive" having general applicability to all insurers
has the effect of interpreting LIRC's substantive policy and was therefore invalid
because it was not promulgated in accordance with the LAPA).
231. Star Enter. v. State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 676 So. 2d 827 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1996).
232. Id. at 830.
233. Id. at 832.
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medications for pain management purposes.234 Regarding the
effect of the LSBN advisory opinion, the court stated, "the LSBN
statement has the effect of both interpreting and implementing
substantive law regarding CRNAs' scope of practice .... Such a
substantive expansion of the scope of practice clearly constitutes a
rule within the meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutes section
49:951(6).,,235 The court found that the advisory opinion had
general applicability because it could be applied to every CRNA,
and all CRNAs were able to freely access the opinion on the LSBN
website and in its regular practitioner journal.2 36 One could argue
that the inclusion of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:963(E)
(added in 1997 and declaring that a rule not promulgated in
accordance with the LAPA is invalid) is unnecessary, given that
the court in Star Enterprise had already established the
unenforceability of a rule not promulgated in accordance with the
LAPA.
' ' 2 3 7
Finding that "advisory opinions," although allowable by the
LAPA, could be "rules" subject to the LAPA's formal rulemaking
requirements sets up an agency clash. Agencies are authorized to
issue advisory opinions by Louisiana Revised Statutes section
23849:962. Advisory opinions, which are considered rulings
concerning the applicability of a particular statutory provision,
"shall have the same status as agency decisions or orders in
adjudicated cases." 239 One commentator noted that "prohibiting
the use of advisory opinions might actually strengthen an agency's
hand by encouraging the agency to apply its interpretation of the
law to a real controversy in an ad hoc adjudication without any
234. Spine Diagnostics Ctr. of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. La. State Bd. of Nursing,
No. 2006 CW 0554, 2006 WL 3804630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006).
235. Id. at *8.
236. Id. Note that the court used the same "general applicability" rationale in
both cases, even though in Star Enterprise, the agency initiated the
communication, and in Spine Diagnostics, the communication was initiated by a
nurse subject to LSBN's regulations.
237. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(6) (2008). See also Star Enterprise, 676
So. 2d at 832.
238. § 49:962.
239. Id. For example, in Spine Diagnostics, the court was considering an
advisory opinion requested by a CRNA regarding the scope of practice under the
Nurse Practice Act (Louisiana Revised Statutes section 37:918(18) gives the
LSBN the authority to develop rules and regulations governing the scope of
practice for advance practice registered nurses.).
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prior warning to the affected party."240 Arguably, agencies could
use advisory opinions, which are considered "decisions or orders in
adjudicated cases," as a subterfuge to avoid the cumbersome
rulemaking process. However, it seems to be that courts are
carefully scrutinizing the effect of such advisory opinions; if the
effect of the opinion is one that would be reached in the
rulemaking process, courts have required that rulemaking occur.
24 1
Advisory opinions in the previous two instances differ from
commonly-called "letter opinions" of an agency (that clarify an
issue upon request of an interested party), because letter opinions
are not binding on a reviewing court and have no precedential
effect for other interested parties.242 Where an agency renders a
letter opinion that does not result in general applicability, a court
should not require rulemaking. 243 The inclusion of interpretations
of substantive agency law as rules is a departure from the federal
APA, which specifically exempts "interpretive rules, general
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice" from the proscriptions of administrative rulemaking.
244
240. Marcello, supra note 1, at 233. Marcello posits several arguments as to
why the courts should encourage "interpretive" rulings by agencies. Id. at 233-35.
241. This particular application of the law of the effects of transaction, rather
than the law of the stylization of a transaction should not seem unusual to a
Louisiana practitioner. The Louisiana Civil Code makes clear that in many cases,
the courts should look to an action's effects, rather than its characterization. See
generally LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2025-28 (2008).
242. These are also known as letter rulings. CITGO Petroleum Corp. v. State
Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 845 So. 2d 558, 563 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2003)
(finding that IRS letter rulings, while they may be persuasive, are not binding on a
reviewing court or the agency).
243. Indeed, it would be hard for a party to challenge such an advisory opinion
based on La. Commission on Governmental Ethics v. Leake, 264 So. 2d 675 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1972). In Leake, the first circuit found that an advisory opinion
concerning conflicts of interest by a potential beneficiary of a contract of
architectural employment could not be appealed, given that there was no final
determination of issues (based on Louisiana Revised Statutes section
42:1119D(4), giving the Commission the power to issue advisory opinions). Id. at
677.
244. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006). Federal courts have distinguished between
interpretations which cover a duty fairly encompassed within the regulation that
the agency purports to construe and leave decisionmakers with discretion (not
requiring rulemaking) and those that deny the decisionmaker discretion in the area
of the interpretation's coverage (requiring rulemaking). Compare Air Transport
Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. F.A.A., 291 F.3d 49, 56 (C.A.D.C. 2002), with Gen. Elec.
Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377 (C.A.D.C. 2002).
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C. A Specialized Function (and Its Problems)-Licensing Boards
1. Scope of the Problem
The ability of an agency to issue orders, as discussed in Part
III, section A, can collide with the rulemaking process. Given that
an agency has the discretion to announce policy through the ad hoc
adjudication process, 245 and that such a decision or order can be
applied to future adjudications by the agency involving the same
issue, an agency can effectuate "general applicability" policy-
making through adjudication. Such general applicability policy-
making properly belongs in the purview of rulemaking. 24 6  The
tension between litigant-specific orders and the necessity of the
rulemaking process can be illustrated by particular issues involving
a board's control over licensing issues. "Order," as defined by the
LAPA, specifically includes the "whole or any part of the final
disposition ... when the grant, denial, or renewal of a license is
required by constitution or statute to be preceded by notice and
opportunity for a hearing." 247 To illustrate the scope of any one
individual agency's involvement in the licensing process, consider
this: in 2005, the Louisiana Department of Labor published the
"Louisiana Licensing Guide," detailing the occupational licensing
requirements for over seventy separate and distinct occupations
and the business license requirements for over sixty separate and
distinct business types.
2 48
245. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
246. The definition of a "rule" includes that which has "general applicability."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:951(6) (2008). For a further discussion of the fine lines
between adjudication and rulemaking, see Bonfield, supra note 102.
247. § 49:951(3).
248. The 2005 Louisiana Licensing Guide is available at the Louisiana
Department of Labor website: www.laworks.net. For those attorneys representing
barbers, florists, or interior designers, as well as those members of occupations one
would expect to be subject to a licensing scheme, the authors suggests taking a
look at the guide.
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2. Extra, Statutory Process Due for Existing Licensees Under
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Bertucci
249
Administrative rules regarding licensing apply when the "grant,
denial, or renewal" of a license is required to be preceded by notice
and opportunity for a hearing.2 5 0  After the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Bertucci, licensees are generally given (in
addition to the opportunity to show compliance with the
re.quirements for the retention of a license) a chance to show that
actions complained of do not violate the law or agency rules before
the institution of formal adjudicatory proceedings. The court
based its decision on Louisiana Revised Statutes section
49:961 (C), which states that:
[n]o revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of
any license is lawful unless, prior to the institution of
agency proceedings, the agency gives notice by mail to the
licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended
action, and the licensee is given an opportunity to show
compliance with all lawful requirements for the retention of
the license.
This is commonly known as a Bertucci hearing, although the
term "hearing" may be somewhat of a misnomer.
252
Unfortunately, the fourth circuit has provided little definitive
guidance as to what would satisfy the requirements of Bertucci.
The court noted that in all agency adjudications, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are required by due process.253  The
LAPA, however, requires "an additional step." The court defined
the additional step as "an opportunity, prior to the institution of
formal proceedings, to show that actions complained of do not
violate the law or agency rules." 254 Bertucci "opportunities" are
required only when the issue is one of suspension, revocation,
249. 593 So. 2d 798, 801 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
250. § 49:961(A).
251. Bertucci, 593 So. 2d at 801.
252. See Foreign Car Sales, L.L.C. v. La. Recreational & Used Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, No. 2007 CA 0116, 2007 WL 3228831, at *3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2007).
253. Bertucci, 593 So. 2d at 800.
254. Id. at 801.
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annulment or withdrawal of an existing license, not when a hearing
concerns the issuance, denial, or renewal of a license. 255 The court
grounded its decision in legislative intent, finding that the
legislature intended the additional step in the limited instances
enumerated in subsection C. 256 However, the court was careful to
note that due process, which is satisfied by an initial opportunity
for notice and hearing, does not necessarily require such an
additional step.
25 7
Given that a license can be suspended by formulation of an
order, which can then be extended by analogy to other similarly
situated licensees, such that an agency's position about particular
conduct becomes a rule of general applicability, it is important to
flesh out exactly what is required by the fourth circuit, or, as the
court stated, the language of section 49:961 (C).
3. Illustration of the Problem Through a Hypothetical
a. Setting
To illustrate, consider a likely hypothetical: 258  A doctor
receives a letter informing her that based on a complaint from a
patient she is going to be investigated for violating the Medical
Malpractice Act. The Board of Medical Examiners requires a
written response from her within thirty days. Based on those
written responses, and together with written responses from the
initial complainants, an investigator-who may be (but is most
likely not) an actual member of the Board-will submit a report to
the Board itself.259 After the report, the Board will dismiss the
complaint, request additional information, or conduct a formal
hearing into the charges.
Do these written responses satisfy Bertucci? At least in theory,
a written opportunity to contest the charges would provide an
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Bertucci, 593 So. 2d at 801.
258. The authors would like to thank attorney Celia R. Cangelosi for her
insight into this particular issue and its importance.
259. Many agencies are statutorily authorized to employ non-board member
investigators. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1270 (2008) (authorizing
investigators and special agents to participate in investigations conducted by the
Board of Medical Examiners).
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opportunity to show that the doctor's disputed actions do not
violate the law or any board rules. If the Bertucci "additional step"
is not grounded in due process concerns, arguably there needs to be
no actual meeting between board members and the investigated
doctor in order to provide such a step. On the other hand, it is
debatable whether or not a written opportunity, without the chance
for a face-to-face interaction, would actually provide a fair
opportunity to contest any charges. The Bertucci court, however,
stated that the later, formal hearing satisfied due process.
While the court in Bertucci did not clearly indicate whether a
face to face meeting with Board members was required, the same
court, in Reaux v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners
continually referred to the "informal setting" in which the licensee
would be allowed to explain herself.260 For most practitioners,
"informal setting" would likely contemplate a physical place,
therefore requiring a face to face encounter.
b. Who Needs to Be Present?
Continuing with the hypothetical: The non-board member
investigator decides that he needs further answers concerning the
doctor's written responses. The doctor appears at a meeting in
which the following persons are present: the doctor, her attorney,
the investigator, and the Board's attorney.
Does this meeting, during which no actual board members are
present, satisfy Bertucci? If the Board has authority to appoint a
non-board member investigator, does that appointment serve as a
delegation of authority to a non-board member? Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 49:491(C) requires that the "agency" give
notice; presumably, the chance to show that the licensee has
complied with applicable law requires a showing also to the
"agency." 261 Does the meeting with no agency board members
present satisfy this requirement? If Bertucci requires a meeting,
then arguably, to comply with section 49:961(C), actual board
members must attend that meeting, given that the requirement of
providing an opportunity to refute charges is relegated to an
260. 850 So. 2d 723, 731 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003).
261. § 49:961.
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"agency." "Agency," as defined by the LAPA, does not include a
non-board member investigator.
262
The fourth circuit has indicated that an agency has some
discretion in how to carry out the informal opportunity mandated
by Bertucci. In Reaux, the court further stated, "[t]he Board has
some discretion as to the manner of providing that opportunity
[under Bertucci] and the licensee is not entitled to dictate to the
Board in that regard., 263  However, it is unlikely that such a
granting of discretion includes delegating board responsibilities to
a non-board member investigator. Other courts have held that
Louisiana law prohibits public boards from delegating statutory
duties to non-board members. For example, in State ex rel.
DeBarge v. Cameron Parish School Board, the Louisiana Third
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a grant of summary judgment in
favor of a discharged school principal who sought a writ of
mandamus against the school board by arguing that the school
board could not delegate to the superintendent the authority to act
on its behalf.
264
[A public board] alone must finally determine every subject
committed to its discretion and judgment. The general rule,
succinctly stated, is that legislative and discretionary
powers devolved by law on a public board or governing
body politic cannot be delegated or referred to the
discretion and judgment of its subordinates or any other
authority. A contrary rule prevails, however, as to
ministerial duties or administrative functions of such board
or body.265
It is unlikely that an investigator's assistance is a ministerial or
administrative function of any board. However, the fourth circuit
has indicated that it may not consider a Bertucci "opportunity" part
of a board's investigatory process.266 A board's hearing panel may
be assisted by independent legal counsel retained by the board who
has not "participated in the investigation or prosecution of the
262. Id.
263. Reaux, 850 So. 2d at 731.
264. 202 So. 2d 34 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
265. Id. at 38.
266. Reaux, 850 So. 2d at 731-32.
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case." 267  Such independent counsel can rule on evidentiar
objections and other procedural issues raised during the hearing.
2 8
The fourth circuit held that the independence of the counsel
authorized by the Louisiana Administrative Code is not
compromised when the attorney in question has previously
participated in a Bertucci hearing on the matter.269  In In re
Shiplov, D.MD., the court rejected the argument that participation
in the Bertucci hearing violates the attorney's independence,
provided that the attorney has not been involved in the
"investigation" of the charges. 270 Since the fourth circuit decided
Bertucci, it is clear that the court does not consider a Bertucci
hearing part of a board's investigatory process.
c. Commingling of Functions
If the Bertucci "opportunity" is not part of a board's
investigatory process, then what part of the process is it? Any
board's process must be either investigatory or adjudicatory. If a
Bertucci "opportunity" is not investigatory, then it must be
adjudicatory. As an adjudicatory process, the commingling of
functions is constitutionally prohibited during a Bertucci
"opportunity."
Assume now that the meeting with the doctor, her attorney, the
investigator, and the Board's attorney satisfied Bertucci. The
board function required by section 49:961(C) is an adjudicatory
function; presuming that it could be delegated to a non-board
member, it is unlikely that it could be delegated to the investigator
that serves a prosecutorial function. In Allen v. Louisiana State
Board of Dentistry, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, "The idea
of the same person serving as judge and prosecutor is anathema
under our notions of due process. ' 2  This brings a practitioner to
an interesting conclusion-a Bertucci hearing, which is not
mandated by due process, could actually be anathema to due
process when a non-board member investigator requests a meeting
267. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 46, pt. 33, § 923(D) (2006).
268. Id.
269. In re Shiplov, D.M.D., 945 So. 2d 52, 64 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2006).
270. Id
271. 543 So. 2d 908, 916 (La. 1989).
2LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
with a person under investigation. Although not explicitly stated,
the fourth circuit has put practitioners in the position of requesting
an informal hearing that would likely have to operate in much the
same way as a formal hearing. Although outgrowths of the fourth
circuit's decision can be confusing, it appears that a valid Bertucci
"opportunity" likely requires presence of the particular board, the
person under investigation (most likely with his or her counsel),
and the actual investigator may be prohibited from attending if the
investigator's presence violates Allen.
4. Records and Waiver
Curiously, the fourth circuit has held that a person under
investigation is not entitled to have a record preserved of a
Bertucci "meeting." 272 Contents of the record on appeal from an
administrative decision are prescribed by Louisiana Administrative
Code section 46:9921(e), and it does not include a record of the
273proceedings at a section 961(C) meeting. Furthermore, in
Reaux, a licensee's refusal to participate in a section 961(C)
hearing that was not transcribed for the record and then
participation in subsequent discovery and pre-hearing conferences
274operated as a "waiver" of the right to a section 961(C) meeting.
Specifically, the board involved found, "La. R.S. 49:961(C), does
not require that the licensee's right to 'an opportunity to show
compliance' must be recorded, and therefore, the Board did not
violate Dr. Reaux's rights by refusing to conduct the '961(C)
meeting' with a court reporter present." 2 7 5 It is important to note
that the fourth circuit referred to a "961(C) meeting" in quotes,
because the parties in that particular case characterized it as such.
Arguably, the fourth circuit refers to the meeting this way in order
to step away from the possible rigid interpretations of Bertucci,
still not defining the actual procedure necessary to satisfy its
decision.
272. Reaux v. La. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 850 So. 2d 723, 731 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2003)
273. Id.
274. Id. at 73.
275. Id.
[Vol. 681362
2008] LOUISIANA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A PRIMER 1363
5. Extension of Bertucci and Rulemaking Conflicts
The fourth circuit extended the Bertucci rationale in 1994 in a
situation that did not involve a section 961(C) hearing. In Amato v.
Office of the Louisiana Commissioner of Securities, a stockbroker
filed suit against the Commissioner of Securities for terminating
his license to sell securities before the opportunity for a hearing.2
76
Amato submitted a U-4 form for re-registration of his securities
license with a new securities company.27 7 The U-4 form required
that any current investigation regarding the applicant be reported;
Amato left that part of the form blank because he "had no notice
that he was the subject of an investigation" by the Louisiana
Securities Commissioner. z78 In fact, there was no way for Amato
to be aware that he was under investigation; testimony by the
Deputy Securities Commissioner indicated that there was "no such
thing" as notice of an investigation and there was no file in the
commissioner's office of persons under investigation in which an
applicant could check. 279 The Deputy Commissioner then
contacted Amato's current securities company and informed the
company that it must voluntarily withdraw Amato's U-4 form or
risk non-renewal of the company's license. 2 8  The company chose
to withdraw Amato's registration form.28 ' The Deputy
Commissioner argued that the Louisiana Securities Law affording
an applicant notice and opportunity for a hearing prior to refusal of
registration did not apply to the case, given that Amato's employer
voluntarily withdrew his U-4 form.
2 8 2
276. 644 So. 2d 412 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
277. Id. at415.
278. Id.
279. Id. The Deputy Commissioner argued that Amato should have been aware
of an investigation into his personal acts as a securities officer because he signed




282. Id. at 416. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 51:703(E)(1) required that
an order be entered refusing to register an applicant "after affording an applicant a
hearing or an opportunity for a hearing," and Louisiana Revised Statutes section
51:716(A) required the commissioner to promptly send to an applicant a notice of
opportunity for a hearing before entering an order refusing to register any person.
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The court rejected this argument and found that due process
required an informal procedure before a refusal of registration
2 83
To make this determination, the court examined its purposes in
crafting the Bertucci "hearing" under section 961(C)---"to 'short
circuit"' the institution of formal proceedings under the LAPA by
giving a licensee the opportunity to show compliance with all
lawful requirements. 2 84  The court then acknowledged that
"Amato's license was terminated before his U-4 was submitted and
§ 961(C) is not applicable., 285 Extending Bertucci, the court held
that Bertucci clearly indicates that an informal procedure is
appropriate when statutory requirements are met.286 To meet this
requirement, the court ordered that the Commissioner promulgate
rules and regulations in accordance with the LAPA. In this
instance, the court at least acknowledges the tension between
generally applicable rules made for all licensees and many
agencies' use of individual adjudication in situations where
rulemaking would be more appropriate.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS
After all of the deliberation (and litigation) over whether an
agency can promulgate rules, whether it can hear disputes, or
whether it can operate in any other manner that may be
inconsistent with the Louisiana Constitution, the courts are not yet
free from the wrangling of power between agencies and the
state.2 88 At the end of the administrative law circle is a court's
exercise of the obligation of judicial review. The judicial review
function of the courts has been affected by Louisiana's move to its
central panel system. California created the first central panel in
1945; Louisiana's central panel, the Division of Administrative





288. Edward Richards, Harvey A. Peltier Professor of Law at the LSU Paul M.
Hebert Law Center, maintains a database of administrative law cases in Louisiana
and elsewhere and the interesting questions that such cases may raise at
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/adlaw.htm.
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Law (DAL) followed fifty years later.2 89  Today's state central
panels are said to represent a trend-"the emerging trend of
restricting or eliminating agency review of state ALJ decisions
thereby making them ... subject only tojudicial review."290 For
some, this restrictive trend cuts against one of the tenants of
administrative law, that "[u]nless the courts maintain their
independence, disallow unconstitutional intrusions into judicial
power, and exercise meaningful appellate review of agency
adjudications, the judicial power necessary to protect individuals
from the effects of biased, arbitrary, or oppressive governmental
and bureaucratic action can be undermined." 1
Although commentators have recognized this trend, not all
central panels directly affect agency review of actions. Whether a
state imposes further restrictions by making some or all of an
AL's findings binding on an agency is a matter of state by state
determination. In Louisiana, ALJs have the power to enter final
orders unreviewable by the agencies that the orders affect.
292
Additionally, no agency (except those exempted by the LAPA
itself) has the right to appeal a decision decided against it.
2 93
289. For more information on the move towards a central panel system,
including the different types of systems and the experiences of several states, see
James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge:
Central Panels and Their Impact on State AI! Authority and Standard of Agency
Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355 (2002).
290. Id. at 1356 (emphasis added).
291. James L. Dennis, Judicial Power and the Administrative State, 62 LA. L.
REv. 59, 60 (2001). Judge Dennis, of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, surmises that under several appellate review theory standards, Louisiana
courts have "performed well in maintaining judicial independence and providing a
constitutional rule of law check and balance upon legislatively created
adjudicatory tribunals." Id. at 93.
292. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:992(B)(2) (2008) ("In an adjudication
commenced by the division, the administrative law judge shall issue the final
decision or order, whether or not on rehearing, and the agency shall have no
authority to override such decision or order. Upon the issuance of such a final
decision or order, the agency or any official thereof shall comply fully with the
final order or decision of the administrative law judge.").
293. § 49:992(B)(3) ("However, no agency or official thereof, or other person
acting on behalf of an agency or official thereof, shall be entitled to judicial review
of a decision made pursuant to this Chapter."). See also § 49:964(A)(2) ("No
agency or official thereof, or other person acting on behalf of an agency or official
thereof shall be entitled to judicial review under this Chapter [adjudication].")
Judge Bybee refers to this provision as "astonishing." Bybee, supra note 104, at
457.
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A. Review and Enforcement of Rulemaking
The fact that an agency can no longer appeal a decision against
it has both judicial review and enforcement consequences. For
example, an agency may establish policy through rulemaking, only
to have an ALJ undermine that policy by refusing to enforce those
rules or construing the rules contrary to the agency's views.
294
The LAPA provides the procedure by which the validity or
applicability of a rule may be challenged.295 In the rulemaking
context, in the absence of an agency's more specific rules, a
challenge that a rule exceeds the statutory authority of an agency
or was adopted without substantial compliance with the LAPA
procedures can only be made though an action for declaratory
judgment. 296  Furthermore, an action for declaratory judgment
cannot be brought if review of the validity and applicability of a
rule can be made in conjunction with a contested adjudicated
case. 297 The First Circuit Court of Appeal has concluded that if a
plaintiff can challenge a rule's validity in an adjudication, such that
the plaintiffs remedy is reversal based on the invalid rule, the
plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the rule through the LAPA
declaratory judgment action.29 8 When a plaintiff brings an invalid
declaratory judgment action, any subsequent injunctive relief is
void.299 The first circuit has indicated that the restrictiveness of the
LAPA in regards to limited review of administrative rules places a
"legal 'catch 22"' upon parties who must attack a procedurally
defective rule only when no other remedy is available: a party must
violate the rule to challenge the rule.
30 0
294. See Bybee, supra note 104, at 460.
295. § 49:963.
296. § 49:963(A).
297. § 49:963(D). Challenging a rule through declaratory judgment requires
that a plaintiff first requite the agency to pass upon the validity or applicability of
the rule. Id. If such review would not provide an adequate remedy and would
inflict irreparable injury, a plaintiff can bring an action for declaratory judgment.
Id. See also Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. La. Ins. Rating Comm'n, 696 So. 2d 1021,
1027-28 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997) (finding that it was inappropriate for the district
court to proceed in accordance with the general declaratory judgment provisions
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure).
298. Id. at 1028 n.6.
299. Id. at 1029.
300. Id. at 1029-30 (on rehearing).
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However, the court has also held that a party can enjoin
enforcement of a rule through a preliminary injunction in a case
where the rule was illegally adopted as an interpretive measure.
30 1
In Spine Diagnostics, the first circuit allowed a declaratory
judgment / injunctive relief action to proceed even though not in
the context of a specific adjudication. 302 Under the LAPA, it is not
necessary to exhaust all administrative remedies before a challenge
to the interpretive measure. 30 3 The petitioner in Spine Diagnostics
challenged the Louisiana State Board of Nursing advisory opinion
that interventional pain management constituted the practice of
medicine. 304 This decision was at odds with the Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners advisory opinion that interventional
pain management constituted the practice of medicine and could
only be performed by a physician. It is likely that had the LSBN
adopted its stance on interventional pain management in a
rulemaking proceeding, the petitioner would have challenged the
rule as being beyond the statutory authority of the agency.
In addition to challenging the statutory authority of an agency
in promulgating rules, an interested person can petition an agency
for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule.30 6 Any agency
faced with such a petition must either deny the petition in writing
with reasons or initiate rulemaking procedures within ninety days
of receipt of the request.
30 7
A court may dismiss a case against an agency on an exception
of no cause of action for failure to follow the LAPA procedures.
30 8
For example, in Merrick Construction Co. v. Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal dismissed a case against the DEQ by the unsuccessful
bidder of a state cleanup contract after determining that the
challenge involved not only an attack on the contract between the
301. Spine Diagnostics v. La. State Bd. of Nursing, No. 2006 CW 0554, 2006
WL 3804630 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006).
302. Id. at *1 n.3.
303. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:963(E) (2008). See also supra Part 1II.B.2.




308. 700 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1997).
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
state and the successful bidder, but a challenge to the underlying
DEQ regulations.3 °9
B. Review and Enforcement ofAgency Action
Agencies enforce regulatory policy in a number of ways. For
example, licensing boards enforce their policies by suspending or
revoking a licensee's right to operate. 310  Such revocations
generally happen in the context of an internal agency procedure.
To illustrate: the Department of Health and Hospitals receives a
complaint about a local restaurant's cleanliness. Upon inspection,
a sanitarian or other state health officer makes a detailed report of
any violations and provides a notice of violation to the restaurant's
owner. Failure to correct the violation results in a compliance
order issued by the agency, from which the owner has a specified
amount of time to appeal to the DAL.3 12 If the owner then fails to
comply with the compliance order, the agency may suspend the
restaurant's operating license, seek injunctive relief, or impose a
civil fine or mandate that the owner attend training sessions in lieu
of a fine.313 An agency's inability to request judicial review of a
decision against it may compel an agency to bring fewer, to
prevent an ALJ from establishing policy contrary to the agency's
view by deciding against the agency. 314  Bringing fewer
adjudications leads to less enforcement of agency policy; although
a case may be factually marginal, marginal cases help agencies
understand the limits of their authority.315 Some agencies, such as
the DEQ, have the option of initiating civil enforcement actions
rather than adjudicative proceedings. 3 16 Agencies that can bring
309. Id. at 238-39. The DEQ was charged by the Legislature with enacting
regulations to implement a solid waste tire recycling and reduction program. Id.
310. See supra Part III.C.
311. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 51, pt. 1, § 105 (2008).
312. Id. § 111.
313. Id. § 113.
314. See Bybee, supra note 104, at 461.
315. Id.
316. See Louisiana Environmental Quality Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30:2025 (2008) (granting civil enforcement authority to the Department of
Environmental Quality). See also Bybee, supra note 104, at 461 (discussing the
reasons why an agency may use civil enforcement over intra-agency enforcement).
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enforcement actions either before an ALJ or a court could end up
with conflicting policies on similar issues.
The filing of a petition in a district court seeking review of an
agency adjudication does not, by itself, stay the enforcement of an
administrative order.317 In order to determine whether a stay of the
agency's action is warranted, courts consider four factors: (1) the
likelihood of the petitioner prevailing on the merits; (2) the
possibility of irreparable injury in the absence of a stay; (3) the
possibility that the stay will harm other parties interested in the
proceedings; and (4) the public interest involved.318
Although there is a presumption of judicial review of
administrative agency proceedings, 319 judicial review of agency
decisions or orders is confined to the agency record and decisions
are subject to reversal or modification only upon two conditions-
(1) prejudice to "substantial rights of the appellant" based on (2)
findings, conclusions, or decisions that are:
a. in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
b. in excess of the agency's statutory authority;
c. made according to unlawful procedure;
d. affected by other error of law;
e. arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by abuse of
discretion; or
f. not supported and sustainable by preponderance of the
evidence.320
Review is only available for "decisions" or "orders." In Delta
Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, the Louisiana Supreme Court
317. § 49:964(C). See also Summers v. Sutton, 428 So. 2d 1121, 1125 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1983).
318. Summers, 428 So. 2d at 1125.
319. This presumption of review has been said to arise as a result of the
debates of the 1974 Constitution over then enactment of the "Right to Judicial
Review" in article I, section 19 providing for "the right of judicial review based
upon a complete record of all evidence upon which the judgment is based." LA.
CONST. art. I, § 19. An examination of the transcripts of the debate indicate that
one delegate, reading the amendment, thought that the delegates were "providing
for judicial review of, in [his] opinion, all administrative agency determinations."
See Marcello, supra note 1, at 190.
320. § 49:964(G). For the presumption of judicial review, see Bowen v.
Doyal, 253 So. 2d 200, 203 (1971) (finding that the presumption of reviewability
stems from Louisiana's legal system and traditions). See also Buras v. Bd. of Trs.
of Police Pension Fund, 367 So. 2d 849, 851 n.4 (La. 1979).
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articulated a standard for determining when an agency action is
considered a "decision" or "order" and thus subject to judicial
review.
321
[T]he [Louisiana] Administrative Procedures Act provides
for a hearing only in an adjudication. An adjudication is a
proceeding resulting in an order or decision. A decision or
order is, for purposes of the act, a disposition required by
constitution or statute to be made only after notice and a
hearing. Therefore, unless there is some provision in the
constitution or statutes requiring a hearing, an agency
disposition is not a "decision" or "order" as defined for
purposes of the act. And unless a proceeding results in a
decision or order, it is not an adjudication as defined in the
act. It is apparent, then, that an adjudication for purposes
of the act means an agency proceeding that results in a
disposition that is required to be made (by constitution or
statute) after notice is given and a hearing is held.... Since
the act provides for hearings only if there is an
adjudication, it follows that unless a hearing is required by
some statute or the constitution, the provision of the act as
to hearings does not apply. 322
In In re Carline Tank Services, the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal, under the standard articulated in Delta Bank, held
that the denial of a request for a hearing by the Department of
Environmental Quality related to the granting of a barge cleaning
permit to another company was not a decision or order subject to
judicial review under the LAPA.323 The Assistant Secretary of the
DEQ was authorized to either accept or deny a petition when any
person that might be adversely affected requested an adjudicative
324hearing. Because the DEQ was not required by statute to hold a
hearing in this particular circumstance, the decision not to grant a
hearing was not subject to judicial review. The LAPA requires an
adjudicatory hearing only when an agency's organic statute or the
321. 383 So. 2d330(La. 1980).
322. Id. at 333. See also supra Part III.A. 1.
323. 626 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
324. Id. at 360-61.
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Louisiana Constitution requires a hearing on the record. 325 This
requirement differs from the federal APA, which allows for a
process of "informal adjudication.
' 326
Additionally, an internal advisory opinion made by the
Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) as to which one of two
companies should be approved to build a DHH home (notice of
which was sent to the non-approved company) was held not be a
decision or order under the LAPA.327  In Bell Oaks v. Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals, the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal found that the committee's decision, reached after
reviewing application documents, was a not a decision reached
after an adjudication.32 8 The adjudication in that case occurred
after Bell Oaks, the company not awarded the state contract,
requested an "appeal" from DHH to challenge the agency's
decision. 329  Although internal DHH regulations referred to the
hearing as an "administrative appeal," the court found that the
hearing could not in fact be an appeal, because there was no
underlying adjudication.
330
A board's enacting statute may attempt to preclude judicial
review. However, Louisiana courts have held that if a denial of
judicial review does not comport with the minimum requirements
of due process, the Louisiana Constitution requires judicial review
under the LAPA.331  Furthermore, judicial review of agency
adjudications made under the presumption of review and a court's
constitutionally vested judicial power, and not specifically
325. § 49:951(1) & (3).
326. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (2006). Under the APA structure, adjudication refers to
agency action that leads to a final disposition and is not rulemaking. § 551(6)-(7).
"Informal adjudication" includes adjudications not required to be determined on
the record after a hearing. See also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
496 U.S. 633 (1990) (finding that an informal hearing to restore pension plans
previously terminated by PBGC complied with the minimal requirements for
section 555).
327. Bell Oaks, Inc. v. La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 697 So. 2d 739 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1997).
328. Id. at 748.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. See Ogburn v. City of Shreveport, 614 So. 2d 748 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1993); Werner v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund, 360 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1978).
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challenged under the LAPA, must include standards of application
that are substantially similar to those under the LAPA.332
Louisiana's peculiar practice of appellate de novo review of
facts applies in the administrative law context also.333 Under
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 49:964(G), when a decision is
being examined for proper factual support, the court can make its
own findings of fact based on an independent examination of the
entire record available for judicial review.334  Although a
reviewing court is entitled to review facts de novo, Louisiana
courts have crafted an entitlement of "great weight" to an AL's
findings of fact, absent manifest error. It is not necessary for the
agency to state with particularity which one of the aforementioned
six standards was determinative in any given case.
3 36
Although findings of fact by an administrative tribunal are
reviewed under the manifest error standard, a trial court reviews an
agency's conclusions of law and exercise of discretion according
to the arbitrary and capricious test.337 An agency's conclusions of
law will stand, under the arbitrary and capricious test, to the extent
that the action taken is "reasonable under the circumstances., 338 In
order to determine whether an agency's action is reasonable under
the circumstances, courts must delve deeply into the minutiae of
complex agency rules and regulations. Complex, fact-driven
opinions arise frequently in the environmental law context, for
instance, where a court is required to review the classification of a
landfill as a particular type of facility under DEQ Regulations.
339
332. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm'n, 452 So. 2d 1152,
1158 (La. 1984).
333. For a discussion of Louisiana's standard of appellate review of facts based
on its history as a "hybrid civil and common law jurisdiction," see Ellis v. Weasler
Eng'g Inc., 258 F.3d 326, 332-34 (5th Cir. 2001).
334. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49:964(G)(6) (2008). De novo review is
somewhat limited by deference ("due regard") given to an AU's determination of
credibility issues, when such credibility has been determined by first hand
observation of the demeanor of the witness. Id.
335. Bell Oaks, 697 So. 2d at 744. See also Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. Robinson,
499 So. 2d 246, 250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
336. See generally Ouzts v. Sec'y, La. Dep't of Health & Hosps., 880 So. 2d
918 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2004).
337. Women's & Children's Hosp. v. State Dep't of Health & Hosps., No.
2007 CA 1157, 2008 WL 399322 at * 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2008).
338. Id.
339. See Oakville Cmty. Action Group v. La. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 935 So.
2d 175, 186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006) (finding that the DEQ's classification of a
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The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of AUpeal has defined
arbitrariness as the "absence of a rational basis." This definition
also requires a heavily fact-intensive review of agency action. In
Magill v. Louisiana State Police Troop G, the second circuit
reviewed a decision of the State Police towing and recovery
association to remove a tow truck driver from a list of rotating tow
truck operators available to answer police calls. 341 A review of the
case required the court to delve deeply into an altercation between
a tow operator and local police officer, in which numerous
obscenities were thrown and threats made to "lay [someone]
out."'342  The narrow question involved was whether the tow
operator's threatening demeanor was grounds for removing him
from the rotation list given that he made threats not during the
actual operation of the tow truck.343 The court held that it was not
arbitrary or capricious for the police to remove the tow operator
from the rotation under the circumstances. 3 " Such interesting
dialogue, that one would assume usually only arises in the criminal
context, is fodder for judicial review in the administrative context
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. The arbitrary and
capricious standard has also been held to apply to review of
punishment or disciplinary action.
345
In the event that an agency's action is considered arbitrary and
capricious, an action for mandamus can lie to correct the
performance (or non-performance) of the arbitrary administrative
act.346 In the licensing context, this should mean that if an AID
landfill as a Type III facility, requiring only a 50 foot buffer zone, was supported
by a preponderance of the evidence and thus entitled to agency deference).
340. Magill v. La. State Police Troop G, 714 So. 2d 139, 142 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1998).
341. Id. at 140.
342. Id. at 141.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 143.
345. Davis v. La. State Bd. of Nursing, 691 So. 2d 170, 173 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1997).
346. State ex rel. Torrance v. City of Shreveport, 93 So. 2d 187, 189 (La.
1957). Mandamus, however, is an extraordinary writ that will not operate when
ordinary remedies are available to grant a petitioner relief. See generally
Bonvillian v. Dep't of Ins., 906 So. 2d 596 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005). Additionally,
mandamus will not lie in an action where an official's decision contains an
element of discretion. Id. at 599.
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finds that an agency revoked a licensee's permit or license
arbitrarily, that the permit or license holder should be able to file a
mandamus action to compel the agency to reinstate the license or
permit. However, one could argue that the availability of
mandamus as a remedy to force an agency to act may be
unnecessary given that an agency, by legislative amendment to the
LAPA, "shall comply fully with the final order or decision of the
administrative law judge. '
347
C. Deference to Agency Interpretations
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court, in its Chevron
decision, enunciated what has become the rule of deference to
administrative agency interpretations of their own statutes.
34 8
According to one commentator, the Court announced Chevron's
rule of deference without any serious discussion of a pre-existing
"complex body of law aimed at calibrating judicial deference on
matters of law to a number of relevant considerations (including
agency expertise, the timing of the legal representation, and the
relative consistency of the agency's position over time).1
3 49
Under the rubric of Chevron, the Louisiana First Circuit Court
of Appeal announced that the same standard of review must be
afforded to the Department of Environmental Quality regarding
whether a landfill was an "existing facility" under its promulgated
Solid Waste Regulations. 35 0  The court noted specifically, "[w]e
believe that the situation posed by an agency's interpretation of the
347. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:992(B)(2) (2008).
348. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding that the determination of whether to accept an agency's action
involves a two-part test: (1) whether Congress has addressed the precise question
at issue, and (2) if not, an examination of the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation). The Court defers in cases in which Congress has not addressed the
question at issue and the agency's interpretation of its power and the exercise
thereof in the given regulatory scheme is reasonable. Id.
349. Jody Freeman, The Story of Chevron: Environmental Law and
Administrative Discretion, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 172 n.10 (Lazarus
& Houck, eds., 2005). According to Freeman, the "shocking" result in Chevron
was "new law in a dramatic fashion" and no one, not even the litigants, "appears
to have foreseen that Chevron would be a major administrative law case." Id. at
194. Although Chevron was a controversial case for its environmental
implications, the deference issue and the separation of powers implications have
come to "dominate" the scholarly commentary on Chevron. Id. at 197.
350. In re Recovery I, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690, 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
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rules and regulations which it drafted is analogous to the situation
where the legislature has enacted a statute and explicitly left a void
for the agency to fill." '' Therefore, the DEQ's interpretation of its
own Solid Waste Regulations was affirmed, given that the
determination was not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the regulations at issue.352 Without mentioning Chevron, the
Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in a subsequent case
articulated that this standard is one of "considerable weight" absent
"inconsistent interpretation of the overall scheme or use of the
wrong rule." 353 Since the First Circuit's nod to Chevron in 1994,
few cases have directly referred to what has come to be known as
administrative Chevron deference. 35 4 Even more surprising, there
are few cases that discuss the scope of deference given to agency
action in general.355
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Felix Frankfurter, in 1927, referred to administrative
law as the filling in of the details of statutory policy.356 It is clear
from a survey of the Louisiana jurisprudence that there may be
more filling to be done. For instance, there are few Louisiana
decisions construing some basic elements of administrative law,
such as the meaning of some of the grounds for overturning an
agency's decision in an adjudication, or the bounds by which a
private party can force an agency to act through the use of
compelled rulemaking. Such large gaps make it difficult to
develop a comprehensive notion of state administrative law. The
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Women's & Children's Hosp. v. State Dep't of Health & Hosps., No.
2007 CA 1157, 2008 WL 399322 at * 4 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2008).
354. See generally Earles v. State Bd. of C.P.A.s, 665 So. 2d 1288, 1290 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1995); Oakville Cmty. Action Group v. La. Dep't of Env. Quality,
935 So. 2d 175, 186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2006) (phrasing the judicial obligation of
deference in light of Recovery I, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690).
355. For a more searching critique of the scope of Chevron deference,
including a view that Chevron may be "dead," see Ann Graham, Chevron Lite:
How Much Deference Should Courts Give to State Agency Interpretation?, 68 LA.
L. REv. 1105 (2008).
356. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 614,
621 (1927) (referring to administrative law as "filing [sic] in the details" of
particular policies).
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task of the 2008 Louisiana Law Review Symposium was to
examine current trends in administrative law and determine,
through consultation and discussion, which of those trends should
be disregarded, embraced, or modified to improve Louisiana state
governance. The authors hope that the 2008 Louisiana Law
Review Symposium laid the foundation for such improvement, and
that this Primer of issues and the state of Louisiana administrative
law will help practitioners in their battles with the proliferation of
Louisiana state agencies.
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